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OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintift: 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the 
Van Engelens"), by and through their counsel of record, oppose the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the PlaintiffWashinf.,rton Federal Savings ("WFS" or "the Bank"). As will be 
shown, genuine issues of material fact prevent the entry of judgment. This opposition supported 
by the Affidavit of H. Craig Van Engelen, and the Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen, previously 
tiled on or about May l3, 2010, prior to their deposition in this case, as well as the Affidavit of 
Counsel, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this action, the Bank is attempting to enforce a purported continuing Guarantee which 
allegedly makes the Van Engelen's personally liable for loans entered into by their real estate 
development company. However, the Bank made multiple misrepresentations in which it stated 
that the loans were not secured by a personal guarantee, and has concealed the existence of the 
continuing Guarantee. There are therefore genuine issues of material fact concerning whether 
the Bank's affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosures (1) constitute a waiver ofthe 
Guarantee, (2) estop the Bank from enforcing the Guarantee, (3) constitute unfair and deceptive 
trade practices, (4) cause the Bank to have unclean hands such that it cannot enforce the 
guarantee, (5) render the Guarantee voidable, (6) cause the guarantee to be unenforceable, (7) 
discharge the Van Engelens, (8) constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, or (9) fraudulently induced the Van Engelens to cause VED to the entered transaction(s). 
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Guarantee was intended to extend 
to the loan at issue, whether the claims can be set oft: and whether the Bank has failed to 
mitigate the claimed or alleged damage. If anyone of these affirmative defenses is established, 
the Bank cannot prevail against the Van Engelens. I Therefore, because there are significant and 
genuine issues of material fact, the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
This fully resolves the Bank's argument throughout its briefing that Washington Federal 
is entitled to judgment because the Van Engelens signed the Guarantee. If this Guarantee is 
unenforceable for any of the reasons alleged, the Guarantee and the alleged waivers contained 
therein have no legal effect, regardless of whether or not it was signed. Contrary to the Bank's 
singUlar focus otherwise, the Van Engelen' s defenses do not raise questions of contractual 
interpretation, but rather genuine questions of material fact about whether, because of the Bank's 
o\vn actions, the Bank is prevented from invoking, relying upon, or enforcing the Guarantee. 
See, e.g. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771,215 P.3d 485,491 (2009) (court erred in 
interpreting contract without considering defense of fraudulent inducement defense which, if 
proven, could invalidate the agreement.) It is notable that the Bank does not address the Van 
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II. DISPUTED FACTS 
In 2002, a real estate company o\vned by the Van Engelens, Van Engelen Development 
eVED"), borrowed $126,000 from WFS (the "2002 Loans"). (Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Labrum Aff"), ~ 3, Ex. A 
(hereinafter "Sullivan Depo."), p. 64:14-65:16; Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Craig AfT.") ~ 3); Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Kristen Aff.") ~ 3). In the course 
of that transaction, the Van Engelens signed2 the personal continuing guarantee which is at issue 
in the present lawsuit (the "Guarantee"). (Labrum AfT. ~ 6, Ex. D (hereinafter "Craig Depo."), p. 
18:20-19:25; Labrum Aff. ~ 7, Ex. E (hereinafter "Kristen Depo."), p. 9:16-23.) The Guarantee 
is purportedly a "continuing" guarantee by which the Van Engelens allegedly have guaranteed 
any present or future obligation ofVED to WFS. Specifically, the alleged Guarantee states that 
"Guarantor guarantees payment to Lender of all Obligations that Borrower owes to Lender now 
or in the future ... Guarantor's Promise extends to all Obligations which Borrower owes Lender 
now or in the future .... Guarantor's Promise shall be a continuing guarantee as to any present 
or future Obligations Borrower owes Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually 
receives wTitten notice from Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise." 
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, ~ 2, Ex. No.1 at 
Engelen's assertions that such misrepresentations occurred, but rather argues in a conclusory 
fashion (and contrary to the facts outlined herein), that there is no question of material fact. 
2 While the Van Engelens have no memory of signing this Guarantee, now that they have 
examined the original, they do not dispute that they signed it. (Craig Depo. p. 24: 19-25; Kristen 
Depo. p. 9:16-23.) 
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Ex. No.7 thereto.) Within approximately one year, VED fully paid the 2002 Loans. (Craig Aff. 
at ~ 5; Kristen Aff. at ~ 5.) 
VED and the Van Engelens declined to do business with WFS for several years 
thereafter because of their belief that the Bank had violated their trust and confidence. (Craig 
Depo. p. 24:19-25; Kristen Depo. p. 18:24-19:15 and p. 20:13-16.) In December 2004, a 
representative of the Bank approached the Van Engelens about renewing their relationship. 
(Craig Aff. at ~ 7.) They were told that the Bank was willing to finance new projects. 3 (ld.) 
Later that month, the Van Engelens learned that a real estate development called Carriage Hill 
was for sale, and negotiated an agreement to purchase that project. (Craig Aff. at ~ 8; Kristen 
Aff. at ~ 8.) They submitted the sale agreement to the Bank and other lending institutions to 
solicit loan proposals. (Craig Depo. p. 26:5-27:6.) In February 2005, Bryan Churchill, a loan 
officer for the Bank, submitted a loan proposa1.4 (Labrum Aff. ~ 4, Ex. B (hereinafter "Churchill 
Depo.), p. 20:6-9; Craig Aff. at ~ 10; Kristen Aff. at ~ 10.) The Bank said that it would require a 
down payment of20 percent, and a personal guarantee signed by the Van Engelens. (Craig Ail. 
at ~ 10; Kristen AtI. at ~ 10.) Mr. Van Engelen told Mr. Churchill that other lenders had 
submitted stronger proposals, (Craig Depo. p. 27:22-23: 13,) and explained that they would 
accept a loan from the Bank only if it agreed to the following three terms: (l) ten percent down 
to include a credit for commission and the $100,000 seller carry back; (2) no personal guarantee; 
and (3) an interest reserve of approximately $50,000. (Craig Depo. p. 34:23-35: 19.) Mr. 
Churchill said that he would have to take these terms to the loan committee. (Craig Depo. p. 
40:2-3.) A few days later Mr. Churchill told Mr. Van Engelen that the loan had been approved 
There is disagreement about the content of this meeting, but Bank representatives agree 
that this meeting occurred. (Sullivan Depo. p. 66: 13-68:25.) 
4 As Mr. Churchill testified, the Bank chose not to put the loan proposal in writing. 
(Churchill Depo. p. 20:10-14.) 
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with these requested tenns, including not requiring a personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 36:4-
21.) 
The Van Engelens caused VED to sign the loan papers with the Bank for six different 
loan transactions, in the amount approximately $6 million (the "2005 Loans"), the tenns of 
which were consistent with those demanded by the Van Engelens. (Craig Aff. at ~ 13; Kristen 
Aff. at '112.) Notably, those documents did not include a personal guarantee, and the loan 
documents did not mention or reference any earlier signed guarantee. (Churchill Depo. p. 30: 12-
34 and 36:4-22; Labrum Aff. ~ 5, Ex. C (hereinafter "Henson Depo."), p. 20:11-13.) 
At closing the Van Engelens sought assurance that a personal guarantee would not be 
required for the 2005 Loans. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9.) A representative of the Bank 
responded that while the Bank usually required people to sign personal guarantees, the Van 
Engelens would not be required to do so because of their long tenn relationship with the Bank 
and the longevity of their company. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 
28:14-23.) The Bank never mentioned the existence of the supposed continuing Guarantee at 
any time prior to or at closing, (Churchill Depo. p. 24:11-16 and 41:6-15; Craig Depo. p. 33:20-
34:3,) although it had numerous opportunities to do so during the lunch to solicit their business, 
during loan negotiations, at closing, and during later loan modification negotiations with the 
Bank. (Craig Aff. at ~ 22.) Bryan Churchill testified that it would have been his custom and 
practice to remind borrowers that the loan was covered by a continuing general guarantee. 
However, Mr. Churchill had no specific recollection of giving this reminder to the Van Engelens. 
(Churchill Depo. p. 22:2-20.) Neither did Gloria Henson, who may have been present at the 
closings. (Henson Depo. p. 13:18-14:1.) The Bank does not have a policy requiring a loan 
officer to remind borrowers of a previously signed continuing guarantee. (Sullivan Depo. p. 
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33:2-17.) In fact, despite the fact that the Bank actually knew of the existence of the guarantee at 
the time of the closing of these loans, (Churchill Depo. 36:23-25,) during the loan negotiations 
and at closing, the Bank affirmatively represented that the 2005 Loans were not secured by any 
personal guarantees. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23; 
Craig Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-20.) As such, the Van Engelens did not revoke this 
alleged Guarantee in reliance upon the assurances of the Bank that the 2005 Loans were not 
secured by any personal guarantees. 5 (Craig Aff. at ,-r 20; Kristen Afl. at,-r 19.) 
VED ultimately defaulted on the loan, and the Bank conducted a foreclosure sale on the 
property. The Bank now seeks the deficiency of $4,452,809.67 from the Van Engelens based on 
the alleged continuing Guarantee. While the bank has sold some of the houses on the foreclosed 
property, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:5-23,) the Bank has not constructed additional homes on the 
lots, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:24-73:3,) and is simply holding the property in anticipation of further 
profits from the sale or development of the property in the future. (Churchill Depo. p. 76:1-19.) 
III.GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Construing the facts liberally in favor of the Defendants, as the Court must, genuine 
issues of material fact preclude judgment in favor of the Bank. lvfackay v. Four Rivers Packing 
Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P .3d 1064, 1066 (2008). 6 
Notably, termination of the Guarantee would not have caused the Bank to refuse to enter 
into the 2005 Loans agreement with VED, because Bank representatives had twice stated that no 
personal guarantee was necessary. 
The Defendants made most of these same arguments, contained below, in its initial 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on or about May 13,2010. 
Strangely, the Plaintiff has not responded to these arguments in the present iteration of its 
Motion. To the extent that the Plaintiff makes arguments in its Reply that it could and should 
have made in its initial briefing on this second Motion for Summary Judgment, such arguments 
should be stricken. 
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A. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank is 
Estopped from Enforcing and/or has Waived the Continuing Guarantees 
Because it concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did not correct its misleading 
assertions that no personal guarantee secured the 2005 Loans, the Bank has waived the right to 
enforce and/or is estopped from enforcing the Guarantee, including any waivers of defenses 
contained therein. 
1. Waiver 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a kno~n right or advantage. 
},Jargaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256,846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993). Waiver ofa 
contract provision is sho~n when the intention to waive is clearly present and the party asserting 
the waiver shows that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his 
position to his detriment. jViagic Valley Foods. Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 
788,10 P.3d 734,737 (2000). Waiver may be inferred from a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel. Jl.;fargaret H Wayne 
Trust, 123 Idaho at 256,846 P.2d at 907. 
The Bank's waiver of the applicability of the Guarantee to the 2005 Loans is clearly 
manifested by the statements of at least two of its employees that no personal guarantee would be 
required for those Loans. (Craig AtI. at' 12-19; Kristen Aff. at' 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-
33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23.) That this is a waiver is underscored by the fact 
that these statements by the Bank were in response to specific inquiries by the Van Engelens, 
prior to consummating the transaction, seeking assurance that a personal guarantee would not be 
required. (Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Craig Aff. at, 12-19; Kristen Aff. at' 12-18.) The Van 
Engelens reasonably relied on these assurances from bank representatives, particularly when the 
loan documents relative to the 2005 Loans were also silent as to the existence of the Guarantee 
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and when the Van Engelens had insisted on terms that would omit any guarantee. (Churchill 
Depo. p. 30:12-34 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-13; Craig Depo. p. 34:23-35:19.) Under 
a waiver analysis, this reliance on the Bank's waiver is reasonable regardless of whether the Van 
Engelens knew of or could have discovered the existence of the Guarantee. As outlined above, 
the Van Engelens altered their position to their detriment because these assurances induced them 
to cause their company to enter into the loan agreements with the Bank without first revoking the 
continuing Guarantee. (Craig AtT at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) Consequently, the Bank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied because there are triable material issues of fact 
concerning whether the Bank has waived its right to enforce the Guarantee, including any 
provisions therein where the Van Engelens are purported to have waived their rights. 
2. Equitable Estoppel 
Estoppel is a bar by which a party is precluded trom denying a fact in consequence by his 
own previous action which has led another party to conduct himself in such a way that the other 
party would suffer. lvfountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 95 Idaho 134, 135-36,504 P.2d 807, 
808-809 (1972). The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the 
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the 
representation or concealment to his prejUdice. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. oICom'rs, 
147 Idaho 193,200 n. 2,207 P.3d 169,176 n. 2 (2009). 
As discussed above, the Bank made both false representations and concealed the 
existence of the Guarantee, a material fact that was central to the Van Engelen's decision to 
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cause their company to enter into the loan agreement with the bank. (Craig Aff. at ~ 13-20; 
Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) The circumstances show that these false representations and 
concealment were made with the intent that the Van Engelens rely on these misrepresentations 
and nondisclosure so that VEO would enter the loan with the Bank, rather than another lending 
institution. The Van Engelens were unaware of the existence of the personal continuing 
Guarantee, (Craig Aff. at ~ 18; Kristen Aff. at ~ 17,) and, particularly in light of the Bank's 
aftinnative misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required, could not have discovered 
the truth. Thus, even if the Van Engelens had remembered their continuing guarantee, they had 
no reason to believe this Guarantee applied to the 2005 Loans because the Bank affinnatively 
told them the 2005 Loans would not be guaranteed. The Van Engelens actually relied on these 
statements by causing VEO to enter into the loan agreement with the Bank, rather than another 
lending institution; and by doing so without first revoking the alleged continuing Guarantee. 
(Craig AfT. at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) Under these circumstances, the Bank should be 
estopped from enforcing said Guarantee. 
3. Quasi Estoppel 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different 
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200 n. 3, 207 P.3d at 176 n. 3. "Quasi estoppel is distinguished from 
equitable estoppel 'in that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, 
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. '" Willig v. State, Dept. of Health 
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& Weljare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995) citing Evans v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm., 97 Idaho 148,150,540 P.2d 810, 812 (1975). Rather, "[t]he doctrine of quasi estoppel 
applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent 
with a prior position. Willig, 127 Idaho at 261,899 P.2d at 971. 
The Bank's present position that the continuing Guarantee applies to the 2005 Loans is 
opposite from its original position, stated at least two different times, that a personal guarantee 
was not required. (Craig Aff. at ~ 12-19; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; 
Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23.) Its original position was a key tactor in the Van 
Engelen's decision to cause their company to enter into the 2005 Loans, (Craig Aff. at ~ 11-20; 
Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19,) thereby giving a significant advantage and benefit to the Bank. It would 
be unconscionable to now permit the Bank to change its position concerning the applicability of 
the Guarantee to the 2005 Loans after its original position was repeatedly maintained in order to 
induce the Van Engelens to cause their company to enter into these loans. Under these 
circumstances, the Bank should be estopped from asserting that the Guarantee is applicable to 
the 2005 Loans. 
B. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's Actions 
Cause it to have Unclean Hands Such that it Cannot Enforce the Guarantee 
Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a court may deny equitable relief to a litigant "on 
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and 
deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640,1648,15 P.3d 731, 
739 (2005). The Van Engelen's description of the facts, outlined in detail above, illustrate that 
there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Bank's conduct has been inequitable, 
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful. To the extent that the Bank seeks any equitable 
remedy in this case, the existence of genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. 
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c. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's 
Misrepresentations Render the Guarantee Voidable or Unenforceable, or 
Discharges the Van Engelens 
The Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the continuing Guarantee and failure to 
correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required renders the Guarantee 
voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van Engelens. See Marine Bank, Nat. Ass 'n v. A1eat 
Counter, Inc., 826 F.2d 1577 (7th Cir. 1987 (a question of fact existed on whether a guarantee 
was voidable due to misrepresentation). Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and 
Guaranty summarizes this principle, stating that "[i]fthe secondary obligor's assent to the 
secondary obligation is induced by fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the obligee upon 
which the secondary obligor is justified in relying, the secondary obligation is voidable by the 
secondary obligor." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(1). Notably, "a misrepresentation occurring after the 
execution of a continuing guaranty may render the secondary obligation voidable with respect to 
extensions of credit subsequent to the misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12, cmt i. See 
Sumitomo Bank of California v. Iwasaki, 447 P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968) ("intentional or 
negligent misrepresentation or active suppression of the truth, will discharge the surety as to any 
subsequently incurred liability.") 
The statement by a Bank representative during loan negotiations that the Bank would 
accept terms that omitted a guarantee, and at closing that no personal guarantee would be 
required, constitute material misrepresentations. The Bank knew that the absence of a personal 
guarantee was a crucial and material factor for the Van Engelens, who explicitly stated that they 
would cause VED to enter the loan agreement only if the Bank would abandon its insistence on a 
personal guarantee. (Craig. Depo. p. 34:23-35:19; Craig Aff. at, 11, 14.) The Van Engelens 
were justified in relying on these statements made by Bank representatives, made during the 
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course of negotiation and at the consummation of that agreement, about the terms to which the 
Bank would assent. The Van Engelens actually relied on these statements by causing VED to 
enter into the loan agreement with the Bank, rather than another lending institution; and by doing 
so without first revoking the continuing guarantee. (Craig Afl. at, 20; Kristen Aff. at' 19.) 
Further, the Bank's non-disclosure of the existence of the continuing Guarantee is also a 
material misrepresentation. Nondisclosure constitutes a material misrepresentation when 
the oblige: (a) knows facts unknov.n to the secondary obligor that materially 
increase the risk beyond that which the oblige has reason to believe the secondary 
obligor intends to assume; and (b) has reason to believe that these facts are 
unkno\\n to the secondary obligor; and (c) has a reasonable opportunity to 
communicate them to the secondary obligor. 
Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(3). This principle also appears in the law oftort, wherein "[o]ne who fails to 
disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from 
acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had 
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose." Rest. 2d Torts § 
551 (1). A party to a business transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he 
knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being 
misleading;" "subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a 
previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so;" and "facts basic to the 
transaction, ifhe knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that 
the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2)(b), 
(c), and (e). See Saint Alphonsus Reg'llvfed. Or., Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508, 861 P.2d 
71,78 (Ct. App. 1992)( citing to the Rest. 2d Torts § 551(2); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 42,740 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1987) (approving Rest. 2d Torts § 551); Everman Nat'f Bank 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 
00409 
v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 118 (U.S. Cl. Ct. 1984) (bank could not enforce guarantee when it 
failed to inform guarantor of subsequently acquired information that made untrue or misleading a 
previous representation). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Idaho Law, the Bank 
clearly had a duty to correct its misleading statements and those false statements upon which it 
knew that the Van Engelens were relying. Further, when, as here, "the creditor, rather than 
debtor, solicits the surety ... the creditor has a greater duty of disclosure ... If the circumstances 
warrant disclosure by the creditor and the creditor fails to disclose, the surety will be 
discharged." Peoples Nat'/ Bank of Wash. v. Taylor, 711 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Wash. App. 1985). 
In the present case, no personal guarantee was included in the loan documents, and no 
mention was made of the existence of the continuing Guarantee. (Churchill Depo. p. 24: 11-16, 
30: 12-34: 14,36:4-22, and 41 :6-15; Henson Depo. p. 20: 11-13; Craig Depo. p. 33:20-34:3; Craig 
Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Afl at ~ 12-20.) Based on its negotiations with the Van Engelens 
concerning guarantees, the Bank had reason to know that the Van Engelens were una'ware of the 
continuing Guarantee or at least unaware that it applied to the 2005 Loans. The Bank had many 
opportunities to disclose the existence of the continuing Guarantee and its applicability to the 
2005 Loans, including during the lunch to solicit the Defendant's business, during the loan 
negotiations, and at closing, but it did not do so. Enforcing the continuing Guarantee imposes 
liability on the Van Engelens that they did not intend to assume. (Craig Aff. at ~ 14-21; Kristen 
Aff. at ~ 13 -19.) Had the Bank disclosed the existence of the continuing Guarantee at the time, 
the Van Engelens would have had an opportunity to revoke that Guarantee prior to closing and 
effectuate their intent, known and communicated to the Bank, that the 2005 Loans would not be 
subject to a personal guarantee. See Sumitomo Bank of California v. lyvasaki, 447 P.2d 956,958 
(Cal. 1968) ("[T]he creditor must not misrepresent or conceal facts so as to induce or permit the 
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surety to enter or continue in the relationship in reliance on a false impression as to the nature of 
the risk.") The Bank had a duty to disclose the continuing Guarantee in order to correct the 
misleading statement by the Bank that the loan had been accepted with the loan terms upon 
which the Van Engelens had insisted, including not being required to sign a personal guarantee, 
and to correct the mistaken belief held by the Van Engelens (which the Bank had fostered) that 
no personal guarantee secured the 2005 Loans. Finally, the customs of the industry and the 
circumstances are such that the Van Engelens would reasonably expect the disclosure of a 
continuing Guarantee. (Craig Aff. at ~ 21; Kristen Aff. at ~ 20.) For all of these reasons, the 
Bank's misrepresentations and material nondisclosure create genuine issues of material fact as to 
the enforceability of the alleged continuing Guarantee. Consequently, the Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment must be denied. 
D. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank has 
Breached its Own Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an obligation implied in every contract. 
See Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287, 824 P.2d 841, 862 
(1991) (discussing the doctrine in the context of guarantees); In re Target Industries, Inc., 328 
B.R. 99, 121 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2005) C"Lenders are bound by an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing by virtue of their contractual relationship with a guarantor"). As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has said: 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires "that the parties perform in good faith 
the obligations imposed by their agreement," Badgett v. Security State Bank, 116 
Wash.2d 563,807 P.2d 356, 356 (1991), and a violation of the covenant occurs only 
when "either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the ... 
contract.. .. " Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990); 
AfetcalJv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622,778 P.2d 744 (1989). 
Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho at 287, 824 P.2d at 862. 
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The Bank breached this duty when it concealed the existence of the Guarantee and did 
not correct its misleading assertions during loan negotiations and at closing that the 2005 Loans 
would be executed without a personal guarantee. Under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, banks are obligated to inform even continuing guarantors of new liability when the bank 
has reason to believe that the guarantor is unaware of this new liability. An illustrative case is 
Lacrosse State Bankv. Estate ofAk·Loone. 359 N.W.2d 179,1984 WL 180170 (Wis.App. 1984) 
(unpublished). In that case, a bank sought to enforce a continuing guarantee against an 
individual who previously had an interest in the borro\ver company, but who the bank knew no 
longer had an interest at the time of the new loan. The court noted that: 
Although the bank had no obligation to give any notice to [guarantor of his 
potential new liability] under the broad language of [guarantor's] continuing 
guaranty, a guaranty is a contract and, as with any contract, a party seeking 
enforcement must have acted in good faith .... the bank knew or should have 
known that [guarantor] had no reason to guarantee new ... loans. With this 
knowledge, fairness dictated that the bank at least give [guarantor] some notice or 
warning if it expected to hold him liable for new ... loans. 
ld. at * 1. 
Such is the case here. Pursuant to the Bank's duty of good faith and fair dealing to the 
Van Engelens, the Bank should have given the Van Engelens notice that they would be held 
personally liable for the 2005 Loans, particularly where the Bank had ample evidence that the 
Van Engelens were unaware of this fact and proceeding only because they had been assured by 
the Bank that there was no personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 
25:23-27:8 and 28:14-23; Craig AfT. at,; 12-20; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12-19.) The Bank's 
misrepresentations and silence violates and significantly impairs the contract, because it 
prevented the Van Engelens from the opportunity to exercise their contractual right to terminate 
the continuing Guarantee prior to causing VED to entered into the loan agreement. (Craig AfT. at 
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~ 20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 19.) As the Bank has violated its own duties of good faith and fair dealing, 
it cannot now enforce the Guarantee against the Van Engelens. 
E. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Bank's Actions 
Fraudulently Induced the Van Engelens to Cause VED to Enter the 
Transactions 
The elements of fraudulent inducement are: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that 
it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's 
ignorance of its falsity; (7).his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury.7 Aspiazu v. lvfortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830,832 
(2003). A described in extensive detail in the sections above, the Bank knowingly made a false 
misrepresentation to the Van Engelens that no personal guarantee would be required or apply to 
the 2005 Loans. (Churchill Depo. 36:23-25; Craig Depo. p. 31:24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-
27:8 and 28:14-23; Craig Aff at ~ 13-22; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12-20.) These misrepresentations 
were made for the purpose of inducing the Van Engelens to cause their company to sign the loan 
documents, and the Van Engelens did so rely to their detriment. (Craig. Aff. at ~ 17-20; Kristen 
Aff at ~ 16-19.) As described in Section C above, the Bank had a duty to correct these 
misrepresentations of fact; as such, the Van Engelens had a right to reply upon such statements. 
Under these circumstances, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. 
F. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the Continuing 
Guarantee was Intended to Extend to the 2005 Loans 
Because the Guarantee was not referenced in any of the documents related to the 2005 
Loans, (Churchill Depo. p. 30:12-34:14 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-3; Craig Aff. at ~ 
7 It is unclear whether an injury must be alleged when fraudulent inducement is advanced as an 
affinnative defense, rather than a claim or counterclaim. Regardless, the Van Engelens were 
damaged by causing VED to sign the loan documents. 
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13; Kristen AfT. at ~ 12,) there is a genuine and material issue of fact as to whether the parties 
intended the Guarantee to extend to the 2005 Loans. The New York case Cadle Co. v. 
Newhouse, 300 A.D.2d 756 (N.Y.A.D. 2002), is squarely on point. In that case, the guarantor 
guaranteed a $50,000 loan in 1989. The guarantee was a continuing guarantee for the borrower's 
liabilities to the lender "now or hereafter existing." The initial $50,000 loan was paid in full. In 
1991, the borrower negotiated a second $2 million loan trom the lender's successor. The 
borrower defaulted on that loan, and the lender sought payment from the guarantor under the 
1989 continuing guarantee. The court held that there was a genuine and material issue of fact as 
to whether the 1989 continuing guarantee \vas intended to apply to the second loan when "[ n Jot 
one document in the record from [the lender] expressly links the 1989 guaranty to the 1991 
loan." Id. Here, no loan documents relative to the 2005 Loans link the Guarantee to that loan. 
(Churchill Depo. p. 30:12-34:14 and 36:4-22; Henson Depo. p. 20:11-3;Craig Aff. at ~ 13; 
Kristen AfT. at ~ 12.) Further, the Bank expressly stated on two occasions that the 2005 Loans 
was not secured by a personal guarantee. (Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33:9; Kristen Depo. p. 25:23-
27:8 and 28:14-23; Craig Aff. at ~ 13-22; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-20.) At the very least, this raises a 
genuine and material issue of fact as to whether the Guarantee was intended to apply to the 2005 
Loans. 
G. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether there are No 
Damages, Unjust Enrichment, Failure to Mitigate, and Double Recovery 
Assuming that the Guarantee is ultimately found to be enforceable against the Van 
Engelens, genuine issues of material fact exist on whether the Bank has actually suffered any 
damages or has failed to mitigated its damages. The Bank seeks the deficiency of $4,452,809.67 
from the Van Engelens based on the alleged continuing Guarantee. While the bank has sold 
some of the houses on the foreclosed property, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:5-23), the Bank has not 
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constructed additional homes on the lots, (Churchill Depo. p. 72:24-73:3), and is simply holding 
the property in anticipation of further profits from the sale or development of the property in the 
future. (Churchill Depo. p. 76:1-19) As a representative of the Bank has acknowledged, it may 
be possible for the Bank to recoup its losses by selling the property for more than the value it bid 
at the foreclosure sale. (Sullivan Depo. 76:25-77:15.) In fact, any sale of the property mitigates 
the Bank's damages. 
The Van Engelens are not attempting to invoke the protection ofIdaho's anti-deficiency 
statute, Idaho Code § 45-1512, which is inapplicable to guarantors. First Security Bank of Idaho 
v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 174, 765 P.2d 683, 685 (1988). Rather, these affirmative defenses are 
directed at whether the Bank would inappropriately receive a windfall by collecting against the 
Van Engelens and still holding the valuable property. A party has an obligation to take such 
steps as would reasonably tend to minimize damages occasioned by breach of contract. Casey v. 
Nampa and lHeridian Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 299,305,379 P.2d 409,412 (1963). As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has said, "a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a defendant is 
ordinarily denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by reasonable acts, 
including reasonable expenditures, after actionable conduct has taken place." Nfargaret H 
Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 123 Idaho 253, 261,846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). Moreover, as a personal 
guarantee is an agreement to pay the amount due if the borrower fails to pay, it is highly 
analogous to a liquidated damages clause wherein the parties agree in advance to the amount of 
damages in case of a breach. Such damages must, of course, bear a reasonable relationship to 
actual damages. See Graves v. Cupic. 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). Under 
these circumstances, summary judgment is precluded because genuine issues of material fact 
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exist on whether the Bank has actually suffered any damages or has failed to mitigated its 
damages. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and as demonstrated by the affidavits, evidence, and 
depositions in this case, many genuine issues of material fact exist which, if proven, prevent the 
Bank from enforcing the Guarantee. As such, the Van Engelens respectfully ask that the Court 
deny the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 2010. I 
_~=---~~/~/_·----------------------­
Dara LabrunV 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0917209 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Bryan Churchill being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am an Assistant Vice President and authorized representative of Washington Federal 
Savings, a United States Corporation, ("Washington Federal"), the named Plaintiff in the above-
captioned action. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN SUPPORT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1 
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2. That, the statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge, and the 
files and records created and maintained by Washington Federal Savings in the normal course of its 
lending activities. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Adjustable Rate 
Straight Note" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen for an 
extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project referred to as Carriage 
Hill, Phase 3. 
4. Attached as Exhibit B hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Short Form Deed of 
Trust" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen on February 24, 
2005, securing the extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project 
referred to as Carriage Hill, Phase 3. 
5. Attached as Exhibit C hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Adjustable Rate 
Straight Note" dated February 22, 2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen for an 
extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project referred to as Carriage 
Hill, Phase 4. 
6. Attached as Exhibit D hereto, is a true and correct copy of the "Short Form Deed of 
Trust" dated February 22,2005 and executed by H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen on February 24, 
2005, securing the extension of credit to Northwest Development Company, LLC for the project 
referred to as Carriage Hill, Phase 4. 
7. That the closings for the above-referenced loans were conducted in February, 2005 
and are separate and distinct transactions from the 2006 and 2007 loans for which Washington 
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Federal seeks relief under its Complaint on file with the Court. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /~ day of October, 2010. 
Residing at .....J...:;~~~'----".:rr-::~-­
My commission eXpIres: -':"'f-=-:..~::...::...!--""--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN CHURCHILL IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 




BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
_y.S.Mail 
/' Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455 
oe0~-
David E. Wishney ~ 
Chad E. Bernards 
Attorney for Washington Federal Savings 
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February 22nd, 2005 
IDatel 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Borrower") promise(s) to pay to the order of WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, 
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702 ("Lender"), the principal sum of 
Ol'lo'E MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND AND NO/looS 
( $1,790,000.00 ) Dollars, with interest on the principal from this date at the rate of ~SE!!:...VE~N~ ________ -:-__ _ 
per cent (7.000 %) per annum until June 1st, 2005 . The interest rate shall then be adjusted for the next 
three months to an interest rate equivalent to the Prime Rate ("Prime Rate" shall mean the published rate quoted on the day prior to 
adjustment obtained from the "Money Rates" Listing of the Western Edition of the Wall Street Journal) plus _______ _ 
ONE AND ONE HALF per cent (1.500 %). Afterwards, the interest rate will be adjusted in the same 
manner every three months until this Note is paid in full; provided, however, that the interest rate on this Note shall never be lower 
than FIVE Al'<'D ONE HALF per cent (5.500 %). Interest on this Note will accrue each month and be 
due on the first of the following month. All amounts owing on this obligation are payable in full on or before Fehruary 22nd, 2007 
If Lender has not received the full amount of any payment by the end of 15 calendar days after the date it is due. Borrower will pay 
a late charge to Lender. The amount of the charge will be 5 % of the overdue payment of principal and interest. Borrower agrees to pay 
the late charge promptly but only once on each late payment. 
If the Lender seeks the services of an Attorney (whether Lender's employee or outside counsel) to enforce any provisions of this 
Note, the Deed of Trust, the Construction Loan Agreement or Land Loan Agreement (if any), or other promises of the Borrower as 
contained in the loan documents, the Lender shall be entitled to all of its attorney's fees and costs of enforoernent, and the Lender shall 
have the right to add these fees and costs to the principal balance of the loan as they accrue. 
All persons liable either now or in the future for the payment of this Note each waive presentment, demand, and notice of 
non-payment of this Note, and agree that any modification of the terms of payment made at the request of any person liable on this Note 
shall in no way impair their liability on this Note. 
Borrower consents that in any suit or action brought for the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust securing this Note, a deficiency 
judgment may be taken for any balance of debt remaining after the application of the proceeds of the mortgaged property; and also 
consents that, upon the default of the Borrower the holder of this Note or a receiver who is appointed by the court, may take possession 
of the mortgaged premises and collect the rents pending judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and apply the net 
rentals upon this Note. 
In any action or proceeding to recover any sum provided for in this Note, no defense of (I) adequacy of security or (2) that resort 
must first be had to security or to any other person, shall be asserted. All of the covenants, provisions and conditions contained in this 
Note are made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind the respective distributees. personal representatives, successors and assigns of 
the Borrower, jointly and severally. Each and every party signing or endorsing this Note is bound as a principal and not as surety, 
guarantor or in any other capacity. 
This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date covering real property located in CANYON County, 
Idaho , and reference is made in the Deed of Trust for rights as to prepayment or acceleration which may be in addition to 
those provided in this Note. 
This Note is made with reference to and is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of ...;I.;.;dah.;.;;;;.;.o'--____ , and all 
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AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: 
Washington Federal Savings Title cilmpany , ',) 
Boise-Main Office Order NUmber OS00027702 
PO Box 1460 
Boise ID 83701 
Attention: ________ _ 
SHORT FORM DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security Instrument") is made ____ -'F,..,e""bruary:..=:!."-'2:::2""n.::;d,c..:2""'OO""S"--______ BETWEEN 
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC 
as Grantor 
("Borrower"), whose address is 6126 W STATE ST, BOISE ID 83703 
and TRANSNATION TITLE & ESCROW, INC. as Trustee, 
whose address is 1750 FRONT STREET, STE 120, BOISE, ID 83702 
and WASlDNGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a United States Corporation, as Beneficiary ("Lender"), whose address is 
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Borrower hereby irrevocably grants, bargains, sells and conveys to Trustee in trust, with power of sale acoording to Idaho law, all 
Borrower's estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the following described 
property in CANYON County, Idaho (the "Property", which term shall include all or any part of the 
Property, any improvements thereon and all the property described in Paragraph 2 of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter 
referred to): 
AS PER ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A", AND BY THIS REFERENCE INCORPORATED HEREIN. 
TOGETHER WITH all the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, now or hereafter thereunto belonging or in any 
way appertaining, leases and other agreements for the use and occupancy pertaining thereto, and the rents, issues and profits thereof 
and all other propeny or rights of any kind or nature whatsoever further set forth in the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter 
referred to, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Lender to collect 
and apply such rents, issues and profits. 
This Security Instrument shall constitute a security agreement under the Uniform Corumercial Code of Idaho between 
Borrower as debtor and Lender as secured party. Borrower grants a security interest to Lender in any of the Property which is 
personal property and also grants a security interest in the property described in Paragraph 3 of the Master Form Deed of Trust 
hereinafter referred to, now owned or hereafter acquired by Borrower (the Property, as defmed above, and the property described 
in said Paragraph 3 are hereafter collectively referred to as the ·Collateral"). 
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING the following: 
(a) Payment of the sum of 
ONE MILLION SEVEN HUND';::;;:RE-;::D:;::-:NINE~;::;TY==TH=O-;::U:;:::SA~ND:-::::--:A~ND:=-::N-::O:::"':/7100s=-----------=-D-=-O"""'LLA:-:-:R=S 
( $1,790,000.00 ), with interest thereon acoording to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith, payable to 
Lender or order and made by Borrower (the "Note", which term shall include all notes evidencing the indebtedness secured by this 
Security Instrument, including all renewals, modifications or extensions thereof); 
P A , D 
~ 
Date 0.1 '1 b 
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of any further sums advanced or loaned by • or any of its successors or assigns. if (1) the 
Note or other writing evidencing the future advance or loan specifically states that it is secured by this Security Instrument, or (2) 
the advance. including costs and expenses incurred by Lender, is made pursuant to this Security Instrument or any other documents 
executed by Borrower evidencing. securing, or relating to the Note and/or the Collateral. whether executed prior to, 
contemporaneously with, or subsequent to this Security Instrument (this Security Instrument, the Note and such other documents, 
including any construction loan, land loan or other loan agreement, are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Loan 
Documents"), together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in the Note unless otherwise specified in the Loan Documents or 
agreed to in writing; 
c) Performance of each agreement. term and condition set forth or incorporated by reference in the Loan Documents, 
including without limitation the loan agreement of even date herewith, which are incorporated herein by reference or contained 
herein. 
THE MATURITY DATE OF THESE SECURED OBLIGATIONS, AS CONTAINED IN THE LOAN DOCUMENTS, 
INCLUDING THE NOTE, IS February 22nd, 2007 
By executing and delivering this Security Instrument and the Note secured hereby, the parties agree that all provisions of 
Paragraphs 1 through 69 inclusive of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter referred to, except such paragraphs as are 
specifieally excluded or modified herein. are hereby incorporated herein by reference and made an integral part hereof for all 
purposes the same as if set forth herein at length, and the Borrower hereby makes said covenants and agrees to fully perform all of 
said provisions. The Master Form Deed of Trust above referred to was recorded on the dates below shown, in the Official Records 
of the offices of the County Auditors or County Recorders of the following counties in the State of Idaho according to the 
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October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12. 1995 
October 12. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 13. 1995 
October II, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 13, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 12. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
A copy of such Master Form Deed of Trust has been furnished to the person executing this Security Instrument, and by 
executing this Security Instrument the Borrower acknowledges having received such Master Form Deed of Trust. 
The Property which is the subject of this Security Instrument is either not more than 20 acres in area or the Property is 
located within an incorporated city or village. 
The undersigned Borrower requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder, as required 
by Idaho law for the foreclosure of a deed of trust. be mailed to Borrower at Borrower's address as hereinabove set forth. 
BOl'~ower .agrees to .obtain all insurance required from time to time by Lender and as elsewhere provided in the Loan 
Documents, mcludmg flood msurance. If Borrower fails to maintain such insurance satisfactory to the Lender, Lender may make 
the payment on behalf of the Borrower and any sums expended shall be added to principal and bear interest at the rate provided in 
the Note. 
00426 
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!f the box preceding any of the following statements an ·X·, that statement is a part of this Security Instriirnetllt. If the box 
is ~ so checked, the corresponding statement is !lQl part of this Security Ins~ent. 
o Paragraph 49 of the Master Form Deed of Trust (which refers to the existence, if any, of an adjustable rate feature in the 
Note) is hereby deleted. 
[XJ The Note secured hereby evidences a construction loan or land loan but is not a combination Note. Paragraph 53 of the 
Master Form Deed of Trust is hereby deleted. 
o The Note secured hereby is a combination construction loan/permanent loan Note. Refer to paragraph 53 of the Master 
Form Deed of Trust. 
o The Propeny or a part thereof is a Condominium. Refer to paragraph 50 of the Master Form Deed of Trust. 
o A fee owner and a leasehold owner of the Property, or a ponion thereof, have executed this Security Instrument. Refer to 
paragraph 51 of the Master Form Deed of Trust 
o The Property or a part thereof is a leasehold estate. Refer to paragraph 52 of the Master Form Deed of Trust. 
o See also Schedule' A» of this Short Form Deed of Trust, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
WITNESS the hand(s) and seales) of the Borrower, and each of them if more than one, on the day and year first above written. 
STATE OF Ie 
COUNTY OF (l$jl ) 
I certify that I know or have satisfactory evide 
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC 
H CRAIG VAN ENGELEN . MEMBER 
/ 
L~~ 
KRISTEN L VAN ENGELEN . MEMBER 
[Nam f person(s)] 
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s knowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument and 
acknowledged it to be (his/her/their) free and voluntary act for the uses !!fPOses mentioned in the instrument. 
Dated: ____________ __ 
(Seal or Stsrnp) 
residingat ____________ ~~--------------
My commission expires ___ --"""<::-_____ _ 
ame(s) of person(s)] 
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and sald person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument, on oath 
stated that (helshe/they) was/were aithorized to execute the instrument and acknowledged it as the 
IH f' nl~{ (J " 
(Seal or Stamp) 
Notary Public in and~in_:ldafklall'too--------
residing at !Ay('.ommissim .... IM2.21110 
My commission expires _____________ _ 
05049 1027 1669 L02o-T !lOl 
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Fi1e No.: 0500027702 
EXHIBIT "A" 
CARR:tAGE BILL SUBDIVISION NO. 3a 
A parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 2 
West, Boise Meridian, canyon County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which 
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears 
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence 
along the East-West mid-section line 
South 89°16'20" West, 525.81 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
South 00°43'40" East, 220.00 feet; thence 
















93.34 feet; thence 
100.00 feet; thence 
50.98 feet; thence 
75.10 feet; thence 
90.17 feet; thence 
South 67 0 30'47" West, 70.21 feet; thence 
South 50°47'56" West, 84.32 feet; thence 
South 55°45'40· East, 137.75 feet; thence 
South 19°17'29" East, 96.69 feet; thence 
South 71 0 02'56" West, 98·69 feet; thence 
36.00 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 85.00 
feet, a central angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing South 11°12'32" West, 35.74 
feet i thence 
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central 
angle of 47°49'18" and a long chord bearing South 00°34'01" East, 16.21 feet; thence 
26.53 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a 
central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing South 21°42'52" East, 26.52 feet; 
thence 
South 71°02'56" West, 50.00 feet; thence 
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 225.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing North 21°29'37" West, 19.96 
feet; thence 
South 65°57'51" West, 100.00 feet; thence 
North 35°27'57" West, 68.23 feet; thence 
North 67 0 58'28" West, 80.00 feet; thence 
North 17°58'38" East, 100.53 feet; thence 
South 73°04'48" West, 30.29 feet; thence 
South 32°18'45" West, 95.80 feet; thence 
North 57°41'15" West, 50.00 feet; thence 
North 32 0 18'45" East, 20.00 feet; thence 
North 61°24'07 n West, 112.75 feet to an angle point on the Easterly boundary of carriage 
Hill Subdivision No. I, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of 
Canyon County, Idaho; thence 
along the Easterly boundary of said subdiviSion 
North 38 0 31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence 
North 54 0 11'38" West. 100.61 feet; thence 
(Continued) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
LEGAL DESCRXPTXON (continued) 
North 14°44'17" Eastl 146.36 feet; thence 
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence 
North 85°25'27" West, 67.36 feet; thence 
North 1°28'46" East, 228,07 feet to the Northeast corner of said subdivision lying on the 
East-West mid-section line; thence 
along said line 
North 89°16'20" East, 871.51 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
CARRIAGE HILL SUBDIVISION NO. 3b 
A parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 2 
West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
CommenCing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which 
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears 
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence 
along the East-West mid-section line 
South 89°16'20" West, 1397.32 feet; thence 
South 3°59'46" East, 563.30 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 3 of Carriage 
Hill SUbdivision No. 3a, as same is recorded in Book of Plats at Page ___ , records of 
Canyon County, Idaho, said point being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
along the Southerly border of said subdivision 
South 61°24'07" East, 112.75 feet; thence 
South 32°18'45" West, 20.00 feet; thence 










95.80 feet; thence 
30.29 feet; thence 
100.53 feet; thence 
67°58'28" East, South 80.00 feet; thence 
South 35°27'57" East, 68.23 feet; thence 
North 65°57'51" East, 100.00 feet; thence 
19,97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 225.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing South 21°29'37" East, 19.96 
feet i thence 
North 71°02'56" East, 50.00 feet; thence 
26.53 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing North 21°42'52" West, 26.52 
feet; thence 
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central 
angle of 47 0 49'18" and a long chord bearing North 00D34'01" West, 16 21 feet; thence 
36.00 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 85.00 feet, a central 
angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing North 11°12'32" East, 35.74 feet; thence 
North 71°02'56" East, 98.69 feet; thence 
departing said Southerly boundary of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 3 
South 19°17'29" East, 315,17 feet; thence 
South 2°16'14" East, 200.76 feet; thence 
North 88°52'57" East, 72.20 feet; thence 
46.17 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a central 
angle of 9°37'10" and a long chord bearing North 84°04'22" East, 46.12 feet; thence 
(Continued) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTZON (continued) 
South 10°44'13 8 East, 50.00 feet; thence 
South 29°32'36" East, 141.65 feet; thence 
South 1°07'03" East, IS.00 feet to a point on the South line of the North half of the 
Southwest quarter; thence 
along said line 
South 88°52'57" West, 696.37 feet to the Southeast corner of carriage Hill Subdivision No. 
2, as same is recorded in Book of Plats at Page __ , records of Canyon County, Idaho; 
thence 
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and the Easterly boundary of Carriage Hill 
Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of canyon 
County, Idaho, 
North 30°50'44- West, 246.17 feet; thence 
North 21°38'55· West, 298.67 feet; thence 
North 90 10'01" West, 78.29 feet; then~e 
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feeti thence 
34.45 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central 
angle of 11°28'39° and a long chord bearing North 12°45'03 n West, 34.40 feet; thence 






Loan No. _0;:;:2:..:4..;;2:..;:0..:,.7-=-.:....:-:c::.-; ___ _ 
$346,320.00 Boise Idaho February 22nd, 2005 
lSlated lDiltel 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Borrower") promisees) to pay to the order of W ASIllNGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, 
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702 ("Lender"), the principal sum of 
THREE HlJNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NOtlOOS 
($346,320.00 ) Dollars, with interest on the principal from this date at the rate of -'S:.:E=.V.:..E=-N:...-____________ _ 
per cent (7.000 %) per annum until June 1st, 2005 . The interest rate shall then be adjusted for the next 
three months to an interest rate equivalent to the Prime Rate ("Prime Rate" shall mean the published rate quoted on the day prior to 
adjustment obtained from the "Money Rates" Listing of the Western Edition of the Wall Street Journal) plus _-::-_~ ___ _ 
ONE AND ONE HALf per cent (1.500 %). Afterwards, the interest rate will be adjusted in the same 
manner every three months until this Note is paid in full; provided, however, that the interest rate on this Note shall never be lower 
than FIVE A!IID ONE HALF per cent (5.500 %). Interest on this Note will accrue each month and be 
due on the first of the following month. All amounts owing on this obligation are payable in full on or before February 22nd, 2007 
If Lender has not received the full amount of any payment by the end of 15 calendar days after the date it is due, Borrower will pay 
a late charge to Lender. The amount of the charge will be 5 % of the overdue payment of principal and interest. Borrower agrees to pay 
the late charge promptly but only once on each late payment. I 
If the Lender seeks the services of an Attorney (whether Lender's employee or outside counsel) to enforce any provisions of this 
Note, the Deed of Trust, the Construction Loan Agreement or Land Loan Agreement (if any), or other promises of the Borrower as 
contained in the loan documents, the Lender shall be entitled to all of its attorney's fees and costs of enforcement, and the Lender shall 
have the right to add these fees and costs to the principal balance of the loan as they accrue. 
All persons liable either now or in the future for the payment of this Note each waive presentment, demand, and notice of 
non-payment of this Note, and agree that any modification of the terms of payment made at the request of any person liable on this Note 
shall in no way impair their liability on this Note. 
Borrower consents that in any suit or action brought for the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust securing this Note, a deficiency 
judgment may be taken for any balance of debt remaining after the application of the proceeds of the mortgaged property; and also 
consents that, upon the default of the Borrower the holder of this Note or a receiver who is appointed by the court, may take possession 
of the mortgaged premises and collect the rents pending judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and apply the net 
rentals upon this Note. 
In any action or proceeding to recover any sum provided for in this Note, no defense of (1) adequacy of security or (2) that resort 
must first be had to security or to any other person, shall be asserted. All of the covenants, provisions and conditions contained in this 
Note are made on behalf of, and shall apply to and bind the respective distributees, personal representatives, successors and assigns of 
the Borrower, jointly and severally. Each and every party signing or endorsing this Note is bound as a principal and not as surety, 
guarantor or in any other capacity. 
This Note is secured by a Deed of Trust of even date covering real property located in CANYON County, 
Idaho , and reference is made in the Deed of Trust for rights as to prepayment or acceleration which may be in addition to 
those provided in this Note. 
This Note is made with reference to and is to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of .:::.I.;;;.da:;:;hc.;o'-____ , and all 
applicable laws and regulations of the United States of;America. 
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC 
H CRAIG V AN ENGELEN . MEMBER 
KRlSTEN L V AN ENGELENI. MEMBER 
I 
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r.-; -AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: Loari-'Number 024 207 299902-7 
Washington Federal Savings Title Company 
Boise-lVlain Office Order Number 0500027702 
PO Box 1460 
Boise ID 83701 
Attention: _________ _ 
SHORT FORM DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security Instrument") is made _____ ~F::::eb::!r.!:u~a!..rv~22::!n~d~,..!2"'00=5 ________ BETWEEN 
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPAi\'Y, LLC 
as 
("Borrower"), whose address is 6126 W STATE ST, BOISE ID 83703 
and TRANSNATION TITLE & ESCROW, INC. as Trustee, 
whose address is 1750 FRONT STREET, STE 120, BOISE, ID/83702 
and W ASHL'IIGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a United States Corporation, as Beneficiary ("Lender"), whose address is 
1001 W Idaho St, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Borrower hereby irrevocably grants, bargains, sells and conveys to Trustee in trust, with power of sale according to Idaho law, all 
Borrower's estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the following described 
property in CANYON County, Idaho (the "Property", which term shall include all or any part of the 
Properry, any improvements thereon and all the property described in Paragraph 2 of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter 
referred to): 
AS PER ATIACHED EXHIBIT nAn, AND BY TillS REFERENCE INCORPORATED HE 
TOGETHER WITH all the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances, now or hereafter thereunto belonging or in any 
way appertaining, leases and other agreements for the use and occupancy pertaining thereto, and the rents, issues and profits thereof 
and all other property or rights of any kind or nature whatsoever further set forth in the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter 
referred to, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Lender to collect 
and apply such rents, issues and profits. 
This Security Instrument shall constitute a security agreement under the Uniform Commercial Code of Idal10 between 
Borrower as debtor and Lender as secured party. Borrower grants a security interest to Lender in any of the Property which is 
personal property and also grants a security interest in the property described in Paragraph 3 of the Master Form Deed of Trust 
hereinafter referred to, now owned or hereafter acquired by Borrower (the Property, as defined above, and the property described 
in said Paragraph 3 are hereafter collectively referred to as the "Collateral"). 
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING the following: 
(a) Payment of the sum of 
THREE ffiJNDRED FORTY S-I---X-T-H-O-U-SA-ND=---T-HRE--E-HUND--RE-D-T-WE-N-T-Y-A-ND-N-O-/l-oo-S------D-O-L-L-A-R-S 
$346.320.00 ), with interest thereon according to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith, payable to 
Lender or order and made by Borrower (the "Note", which term shall include all notes evidencing the indebtedness secured by this 
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b) Payment of any further sums advanced or loaned by Lender to Borrower, or any of its successors or assigns, if (I) the 
Note or other writing evidencing the future advance or loan specifically states that it is secured by this Security Instrument, or (2) 
the advance, including costs and expenses incurred by Lender, is m/<Ie pursuant to this Security Instrument or any other documents 
executed by Borrower evidencing, securing, or relating to the Note and/or the Collateral, whether executed prior to, 
contemporaneously with, or subsequent to this Security Instrument (this Security Instrument, the Note and such other documents, 
including any construction loan, land loan or other loan agreement, are hereinafter collectively rererred to as the "Loan 
Documents"), together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in the Note unless otherwise specified in the Loan Documents or 
agreed to in writing; 
c) Performance of each agreement, term and condition set forth or incorporated by reference in the Loan Documents, 
including without limitation the loan agreement of even date herewith, which are incorporated herein by reference or contained 
herein. 
THE MATURITY DATE OF THESE SECURED OBLIGATIONS, AS CONTAINED IN THE LOAN DOCUMENTS, 
INCLUDING THE NOTE, IS Fehruary 22nd. 2007 
By executing and delivering this Security Instrument and the Note secured hereby, the parties agree that all provisions of 
Paragraphs I through 69 inclusive of the Master Form Deed of Trust hereinafter referred to, except such paragraphs as are 
specifically excluded or modified herein, are hereby incorporated herein by reference and made an integral part hereof for all 
purposes the same as if set forth herein at length, and the Borrower hereby makes said covenants and agrees to fully perform all of 
said provisions. The Master Form Deed of Trust above referred to was recorded on the dates below shown, in the Official Records 
of the offices of the County Auditors or County Recorders of the following counties in the State of Idaho according to the 
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October II, 1995 
October I J, 1995 
October II, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October II, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 13, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 13, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12. 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October II, 1995 
October 11. 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October II, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October II, 1995 
October I 1, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
October 12, 1995 
October 11, 1995 
A copy of such Master Form Deed of Trust has been furnished to the person executing this Security Instrument, and by 
executing this Security Instrument the Borrower acknowledges having received such Master Form Deed of Trust. 
The Property which is the subject of this Security Instrument is either not more than 20 acres in area or the Property is 
located within an incorporated city or village. 
The undersigned Borrower requests that a copy of any Notice of Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder, as required 
by Idaho law for the foreclosure of a deed of trust, be mailed to Borrower at Borrower's address as hereinabove set forth. 
Borrower agrees to obtain all insurance required from time to time by Lender and as elsewhere provided in the Loan 
Documents, including flood insurance. If Borrower fads to maintain such insurance satisfactory to the Lcnder, Lender may make 
the payment on behalf of the Borrower and any sums expended shall be added to principal and bear interest at the rale provided in 
the Note. 
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If the box preceding any of the following statements contains an "X", that statement is a part of this Security Instrument. If the box 
is !lQ!. so checked, the corresponding statement is not part of this Security Instrument. 
o Paragraph 49 of the Master Form Deed of Trust (which refers to the existence, if any, of an adjustable rate feature in the 
Note) is hereby deJeted. 
[]] The Note secured hereby evidences a construction loan or land loan but is not a combination Note. Paragraph 53 of the 
Master Form Deed of Trust is hereby deleted. 
The Note secured hereby is a combination construction loan/permanent loan Note. Refer to paragraph 53 of the Master 
Form Deed of Trust. 
o The Property or a part thereof is a Condominium. Refer to paragraph 50 of the Master Form Deed of Trust. 
A fee owner and a leasehold owner of the Property, or a portion thereof, have executed this Security Instrument. Refer to 
paragraph 51 of the Master Form Deed of Trust 
o The Property or a part thereof is a leasehold estate. Refer to paragraph 52 of the Master Form Deed of Trust. 
o See also Schedule" A" of this Short Form Deed of Trust, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
WITNESS the hand(s) and seales) of the Borrower, and each of them if more than one, on the day and year first above written. 
STATE OF 
) ss, 
COUNTY OF ) 
I that I know or have <ot;ef·,~",~, 
NORTHWEST DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC 
z<:---
~
H CRAIG VZN. E  LEN - MEMBER 
/.' /.----.....-----
</~-.;: --- -"~ 
KRISTEN L·Y AN ENGELEN MEMBER 
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument and 
acknowledged it to be (his/her/their) free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes mentioned in the instrument, 
Dated: _______ _ 
(Seal or Starnp) 
1, , 
STATE OF JdL(hu 
,1 ! 
COUNTY OF !f..tltL 
(Signature) 
Notary Public in and for the State of ______ _ 
residing at _________________ _ 
My commission expires ____________ _ 
, [Narne(s) of person(s)] 
is/are the person(s) who appeared before me, and said person(s) acknowledged that (he/she/they) signed this instrument, on oath 
stated that (he/she/they) waslwere authorized to execute the instrument and acknowledged it as the tv') t,,\rl !U ( ':' 
(Seal or Stamp) 
(Page 3 of 3) 
Notary Public in and for the State of ______ _ 
residing at -------'RI'IiImIllill· IIIrlia.,ilM~_IIiI'IR*.,-a~lIMiI_---­
My commission expires _.!l!_!IUo!I'cm!t!!oo!l!!!!_!!l!!. __ ,.,..·""",-,11",·",t2",~=O,,-_ 
0504910311669 ;'020-T (0) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
PHASE 4 
Pc parcel of land located in the North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 31, 
Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly 
described as follows: 
commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which 
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears 
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence 
a10ng the East-West mid-section line 
South 89°16'20" West, 302.20 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
South 19°37'40" East, 96.90 feet; thence 
South 40°24'03" East, 92.27 feet; thence 
South 36°30'19" East, 118.29 feet; thence 
South 00°54'00" East, 445.00 feet; thence 
South 36°02'38" East, 234.96 feet to a point on the East boundary of said Section 31; 
thence 
a10ng said boundary 
South 00°22'13" East, 395.95 feet to the South 1/16 corner common to said Sections 31 and 
32; thence 
a10ng the South boundary of the North half of the Southeast quarter 
South 88°52'57" West, 1223.46 feet; thence '-----
North 30°50'44" West, 246.17 feet; thence 
North 21°38'55" West, 195.94 feet to the Southeast corner of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 
1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of Canyon County, Idaho; 
t.hence 
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and continuing 
North 21°38'55" West, 102.73 feet; thence 
North 9 0 10'01" West, 78.29 feet; thence 
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feet; thence 
34.45 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central 
angle of llD28' 39" and a long chord bearing North 12°45' 03" West, 34.40 feet; thence 
( Continued) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION {continued} 
North 71030' 38" East, 131.75 feet; thence 
North 39°31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence 
North 54 Q 11'38" West, 100.61 feet; thence 
North 14°44'17" East, 146.36 feet; thence 
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence 
North 85°25'27" West, 67.36 feet; thence 
North 1028' 46" East, 228.07 feet to a point on the East-West mid-section line; thence 
departing said Easterly boundary 
North 89°16'20" East, 1095.11 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING· 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM a parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, 
Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which 
the Southeast corner of said Section 31 bears 
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence 
along the East-West mid-section line 
South 89°16'20" West, 525.81 feet to the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
South 00°43'40" East, 220,00 feet; thence 
South 89°16'20" West, 12.46 feet; thence 
South 00°22'47" West, 9334 feet; then~ 
North 89°37'13" West, 100.00 feet; thence 
South 79°06'59" West, 50 98 feet; thence 
South 82°39'31" West, 75.10 feet; thence 
South 67°21'43" West, 90.17 feet; thence 
South 67°30'47" West, 70.21 feet; thence 
South 50°47'56" West, 84.32 feet; thence 
South 55°45'40" East, 137.75 feet; thence 
South 19°17'29" East, 96.69 feet; thence 
South 71°02'56" West, 98.69 feet; thence 
36.00 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a raa~us of 85.00 
feet, a central angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing South 11°12'32" West, 35.74 
feet; thence 
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 20.00 feet, a central 
angle of 47°49'18" and a long chord bearing South 00°34'01" East, 16.21 feeti thence 
26.53 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a 
central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing South 21°42'52" East, 26 52 feet; 
thence 
South 71002'56" West, 50.00 feet; thence 
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 225.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing North 21°29'37" West, 19.96 
feet; thence 
South 65°57'51" West, 100.00 feet; thence 
North 35°27'57" West, 6823 feet; thence 
North 67°58'28" i'iest, 80.00 feet; thence 
North 17°58'38" East, 100.53 feet; thence 
South 73°04'48" West, 30.29 feet; thence 
South 32°18'45" West, 95.80 feet; thence 
North 57 D41'15" West, 50.00 feet; thence 
North 32°18'45" East, 20.00 feet; thence 
(Continued) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued) 
North 61°24'07" West, 112.75 feet to an angle point on the Easterly boundary of Carriage 
H~ll Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of Plats at Page 29, records of 
Canyon County, Idaho; thence 
along the Easterly boundar.! of said subdivision 
North 38°31'58" East, 100.11 feet; thence 
North 54°11'38 u West, 100.61 feet; thence 
North 14°44'17" East, 146.36 feet; thence 
North 4°34'33" East, 50.00 feet; thence, 
North 85°25'27u West, 67.36 feet; thence 
North 1°28'46" East, 228.07 feet to the Northeast corner of said subdivision lying on the 
East-West mid-section line; thence 
along said line 
North 89°16'20" East, 871.51 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO EXCEPTING THEREFROM a parcel of land located in the Southeast quarter of Section 31, 
Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Commencing at the quarter corner common to Section 32 and the said Section 31, from which 
the Southeasc corner of said Section 31 bears 
South 00°22'13" East, 2582.70 feet; thence 
along the East-West mid-section ~e 
South 89°16'20" West, 1397.32 feet; thence 
South 3°59'46" East, 563,30 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 3 of Carriage 
Hill Subdivision No" 3a, as same is recorded in Book of Plats at Page __ , records of 
Canyon County, Idaho, said point being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
along the Southerly border of said subdivision 
South 61°24'07" East, 112.75 feet; thence 
South 32°18'45" West, 20.00 feet; thence 
South 57°41'15/1 East, 50.00 feet; thence 
North 32°18'45. East, 95.80 feet; thence 
North 73°04'48. East, 30,29 feet; thence 
South 17°58'38" West, 100.53 feet; thence 
South 67°58'28" East, 80.00 feet; thence 
South 35°27'57" East, 68.23 feet; thence 
North 65°57'51 u East. 100.00 feet; thence 
19.97 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the right, having a radius of 225.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°05'05" and a long chord bearing South 21°29'37" East, 19.96 
feet; thence 
North 71 0 02'56" East, 50.00 feet; thence 
26.53 feet along the arc of a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 
feet, a central angle of 5°31'36" and a long chord bearing North 21°42'52" West, 26.52 
feet; thence 
16.69 feet along the arc of a curve to the right, having a radius of 20,00 feet, a central 
angle of 47°49' 18" and a long chord bearing North 00 0 34'01" West , 16.21 feet, thence 
36.00 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 85.00 feet, a central 
angle of 24°16'11" and a long chord bearing North 11°12'32" East. 3574 feet; thence 
North 71°02'56" East, 98.69 feeti thence 
departing said Southerly boundary of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 3 
South 19°17'29" East, 315,17 feet; thence 
South 2°16'14" East, 200.76 feet; thence 
(Continued) 
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SCHEDULE A (continued) 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION (continued) 
North 88°52'57" East, 72.20 feet; thence 
46.17 feet along the arc of a curve to the left, having a radius of 275.00 feet, a central 
angle of 9°37' 10" and a long chord bearing North 84°04' 22" East, 46.12 feet; thence 
South 10°44'13" East, 50 00 feet; thence 
South 29°32'36" East, 141.65 feet; thence 
South 1°07'03" East, 15 00 feet to a point on the South line of the North half of the 
Southwest quarter; thence 
along said line 
South 88°52'57" West, 696.37 feet to the Southeast corner of Carriage Hill Subdivision No. 
2, as same is recorded in Book of Plats at Page __ , records of Canyon County, Idaho; 
thence 
along the Easterly boundary of said subdivision and the Easterly boundary of Carriage Hill 
Subdivision No.1, as same is recorded in Book 26 of plats at Page 29, records of Canyon 
County, Idaho, 
North 30°50'44" West, 246.17 feet; thence 
North 21°38'55" West, 298 67 feet; thence 
North 9°10'01" West, 78.29 feet; thence 
North 7°00'43" West, 94.64 feet; thence 
34.45 feet along the arc ~a curve to the left, having a radius of 172.00 feet, a central 
angle of 11°28'39" and a long chord bearing North 12°45'03" West, 34.40 feet; thence 
North 71°30'38" East, 131.75 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Fax: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
:~:-: ---'-~ ~ ~ 
OCT 2 1 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
By CARlY LAnMORE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SA VINGS, ) 
a United States Corporation, ) CASE NO. CV OC 0917209 
) 
Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
vs. ) OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN ) 
L. V AN ENGELEN, ) 
ORIGINAL ) Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff, Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal"), by and through its counsel 




In this action, the Plaintiff seeks recovery of the combined deficiency balances remaining due 
following non-judicial foreclosures of six land/development and construction loans made by 
Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal") to Van Engelen Development, Inc., ("VED"). 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUMMARY OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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The individual Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen, ("Van Engelens"), are the guarantors 
of the six VED loans. The Van Engelens argue that the Continuing General Guaranty Agreement 
(the "Guaranty") signed by them either (1) does not extend to the VED loans; or (2) if it does apply, 
then it should be held unenforceable. The lynch pin to every defense asserted by the Van Engelens 
is a series of alleged mis-representations (or concealment) attributed to two Washington Federal 
employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as "mis-representations"). Even assuming the mis-
representations were made, (a fact which is adamantly denied by Washington Federal), the 
Defendants reliance thereon is misplaced, and their affirmative defenses are fatally defective, for two 
reasons: 
1. The mis-representations (a) were made in the context of loans extended to a 
borrower other than VED, and (b) were made nearly a year before closing ofthe 
first of the six VED loans. 
2. Notwithstanding the mis-representations, the Van Engelens are unable to 
establish one or more material elements of each affirmative defense. 
In response to the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, the Defendants have failed to produce 
any admissible evidence supporting their defenses, and as such Washington Federal's Motion For 
Summary must be granted. 
As set forth in Washington Federal's prior briefing, the Defendants carry the burden of proof 
with respect to the affirmative defenses it asserts in their opposition to summary judgment. See, 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769-71, 215 P.3d 485, 489-91 (August 24, 2009) ("[W]e 
conclude that a non-moving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense 
on a motion for summary judgment."). Further, in order to defeat summary judgment, the Van 
Engelens "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Banner Life 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUMMARY OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, _, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009). 
(emphasis added). Finally, a "mere scintilla" of evidence, speculation or slight doubt as to the facts 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. See Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 182, 229 
P.3d. 1164 (2010); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
A. The Defendants' alleged Mis-Representations Do Not Apply to the Loans for 
which Washington Federal Seeks Recovery 
The Van Engelens collective recollection concerning (i) who made the mis-representations, 
and (ii) whether the mis-representations were made in person or during phone conversation(s) is 
hazy, at best. However, the Van Engelens are definitive in their assertion that the misrepresentations 
occurred during the course of negotiation and closing of two loans on February 24,2005.1 In their 
briefing, the Van Engelens refer to the two loans as the "2005 Loans". 2 During the course of his 
deposition, Craig Van Engelen described the purpose and/or context of the two loans as being for 
the acquisition of Phases III and IV of the Carriage Hill Subdivision project.3 
As noted above, in this action, Washington Federal seeks recovery upon six loans extended 
to VED. The first of these loans was made on January 18,2006, and the last was made on March 
28,2007.4 In distinct contrast to the six VED loans, the "2005 Loans" were extended to Northwest 
Development Company, LLC, (a separate Van Engelen controlled entity), and, as alleged by the Van 
Engelens, the 2005 Loan documents were executed on February 24, 2005 to facilitate Northwest 
1,13-15, Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen;, 12-14, Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen. 
2 Pg. 6, line 4, Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment 
3 Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 26-27; 34, 37, 38-39 
4 Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to Deposition of Craig Van Engelen. 
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Development's acquisition of phases III and IV of Carriage Hill. 5 Washington Federal does not seek 
recovery upon either of the 2005 Loans. The Van Engelens have offered no evidence whatsoever 
concerning the six loans made to VED. Thus, even when the mis-representation evidence is viewed 
in a light most favorable to the Defendants, it fails to support the Van Engelens' arguments for 
invalidating their Guaranty ofthe six VED loans. As a matter oflaw, Washington Federal's Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be granted. 
It is also noteworthy that, according to Craig Van Engelen, the topic of personal guaranties 
arose in connection with the 2005 Loans because of the Van Engelens' recently adoption ofa policy 
whereby they would no longer offer personal guaranties ofloans made to their development entities. 6 
However, it is clear that the Van Engelens quickly abandoned this policy when, commencing on or 
March 22,2005, and continuing through April, 2007, they executed a series of personal guaranty 
agreements for loans extended to various development entities by Mountain West Bank and Bank 
of The Cascades. 7 
B. The Defendants Cannot Meet Their Burden on Their Affirmative Defenses 
Even assuming the Van Engelens allegations of misrepresentation occurred, they Van 
Engelens have not meet their burden of proof for any of the affirmative defenses set forth in their 
5 Supplemental Affidavit of Bryan Churchill. (The files from which the documents 
attached to the affidavit of Mr. Churchill were produced to the Defendants in response to their 
discovery requests). 
6 Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 40-42. 
7 Aff. Of Counsel, Exhibit 6 (exhibit 10 attached thereto), and Exhibit 7, (exhibit nos. 2-
9 attached thereto). 
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Amended Answer. 
(1) Waiver, Equitable Estoppel, Misrepresentation and Fraudulent 
Inducement 
As correctly briefed and cited by Defendants in their opposition memorandum, a common 
element to the defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, misrepresentation/fraud and fraudulent 
inducement, is reliance. See Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. 134 Idaho 785, 
788,10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000); Terrazasv. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. oICom'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200n. 
2,207 P.3d 169, 176 n.2 (2009); Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, _, 150 
P.3d 288, 293 (2006); Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830,832 (2003). In their 
response to the Plaintiffs Motion, the Van Engelens have failed to submit admissible evidence 
demonstrating that they relied upon any alleged misrepresentation to their detriment. 
The Van Engelens allege, that before entering into the 2005 Loans with Washington Federal, 
they solicited loan proposals from other lending institutions, that the other banks submitted "stronger 
proposals", which did not require the Van Engelens to personally guaranty the loans.8 In substance, 
the Van Engelens assert that but for their reliance upon Washington Federal's misrepresentations, 
they could have secured loans with a competing bank without the necessity of a personal guaranty. 
In order to establish this element of their defenses, the Van Engelens must necessarily introduce 
evidence of the terms offered by the competing banks. 
In his deposition, Craig Van Engelen testified that the competing bank proposals were 
8 ~~ 9 and 11, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen, ~ 9 of Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van 
Engelen depo. pg. 26-28. 
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provided in writing, and that the proposals were probably in the landfill.9 Thus, the "reliance" 
evidence proffered by the Van Engelens consists entirely of testimony concerning the contents of 
writings that have not been offered into evidence. 
When evidence presented in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment is challenged 
as being inadmissible, the trial court must determine the admissibility of the evidence before ruling 
on the motion. Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct.App.1992). The Defendants' 
oral allegations that other banks submitted written proposals which did not require a personal 
guaranty is inadmissible hearsay. LR.E. 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." LR.E. 802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or 
other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." Any reference to the contents of the loan 
proposals is inadmissible hearsay should not be considered by the Court in reaching a decision on 
the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
The V an Engelens' reliance argument is further undermined by Craig Van Engelen specific 
admission that the competing loan proposals he solicited were "not on the six loans" {at issue in this 
lawsuit}, but were solicited "on the Carriage Hill No.3 and 4 loans". 10 
(2) Quasi Estoppel 
The Van Engelens' quasi-estoppel argument is equally lacking in merit. Simply put, 
Washington Federal did not change its position concerning the necessity ofa personal guaranty. As 
9 Craig Van Engelen depo. pgs. 27, 44. 
10 Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 26-27. 
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demonstrated above, the six VED loans at issue in this lawsuit are distinct transactions from the 2005 
Loans upon which the Van Engelens rely. The subject Guaranty imposes personal liability upon the 
Van Engelens for obligations taken out and defaulted upon by Van Engelen Development, not 
Northwest Development. Moreover, no advantage to Washington Federal, nor a disadvantage to the 
Defendants occurred other than what was contracted for under the Guaranty. Finally, Defendants 
were not induced to change positions, because as argued above, there is no admissible evidence to 
prove the Defendants would or could have obtained loans from other banks without the requirement 
of a personal guaranty. 
(3) Unclean Hands 
Because Washington Federal brings a legal claim, as opposed to an equitable claim, 
under the Guaranty based upon Van Engelen Development's default upon its promissory notes, 
the Defendants' affirmative defense of unclean hands is inapplicable in this instance. 
(4) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only arises as to terms agreed to by the 
parties. Lettunich v. Key Bank National Assoc., 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005). 
(emphasis added). Clearly a valid contract exists between Washington Federal and the Van Engelens 
in the form of the subject Guaranty of the VED loans. However, the Defendants' allegations of 
misrepresentations relating to the 2005 Loans necessarily relate to a separate contract/guaranty in 
which the Van Engelens obligated themselves to guaranty the obligations of Northwest Development 
- a separate and distinct party under a separate and distinct contract. Therefore, as a matter oflaw, 
no affirmative defense for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing lies under 
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the subject Guaranty. 
(5) The Defendants' Argument Regarding No Damages, Unjust Enrichment, 
Failure to Mitigate, and Double Recovery are Not Supported by Idaho Law 
The Defendants argue that in the event the Guaranty is found to be enforceable against them, 
there exists genuine issues of material fact on whether Washington Federal actually suffered any 
damages or that it failed to mitigate its damages. Defendants' argument (which same argument they 
made and the Court rejected at Washington Federal's Motion for a Protective Order on August 12, 
2010) reasons that because Washington Federal owns the real property collateral by virtue of 
trustees' sales, it has on obligation to mitigate its damages through future sales of the property. 
While Washington Federal does not contest that there exists a general duty to mitigate 
damages, such duty must only be reasonable. 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262, 796 P.2d 134, 
139 (Ct.App. 1990). Here, Washington Federal acted reasonably by properly foreclosing upon the 
collateral via notice and sale pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. Once a sale is made pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. all interest in the property is foreclosed and terminated as to all 
persons having an interest therein (and entitled to notice under the act) and there is no right of 
redemption. See, Idaho Code § 45-1508. The Defendants, as guarantors, have no right to look to 
the real property collateral in an effort to lessen its damages. Because the Defendants 
unconditionally guaranteed the obligations of Van Engelen Development, any implied obligation 
which limits Washington Federal's right of recovery, (i.e. an implied obligation to develop or sell 
the property at a later date), is improper. 
Following the Defendants' logic, if Washington Federal chose to hold onto the real property 
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collateral for twenty years or more before deciding to sell off parcels (or in whole), the Court would 
be required to retain jurisdiction over this matter indefinitely to make a determination of damages. 
As titled owners of the collateral, Washington Federal can elect to either sit on the property or begin 
selling it immediately without reduction of the amount of damages owed under contract (not statute) 
by the Defendants-Guarantors, who never had an interest in the property to being with. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Defendants' failure to mitigate damages argument fails 
too because, as outlined at length above, the alleged misrepresentations and concealment by 
Washington Federal apply to different loan transactions than the damages which Washington Federal 
seeks under this lawsuit. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Washington Federal respectfully requests summary judgment 
judgment against the Van Engelen Defendants, establishing both their liability, and the damages 
arising from the Guaranty that they executed on behalf of V an Engelen Development, Inc., in respect 
to the six defaulted loans that have been placed at issue in this action. 
s:.t-
Respectfully submitted this'? 1-day of October, 2010. 
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State of ) 
Case No. CV .. OC 0917209 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG 
VAN ENGELEN IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
H. Craig Van Engelen, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows! 
1. J make this affida\lit upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a Defendant in the above-<:aptioned case 
3. Northwest Developm(lnt Company, LLC. and Van Enge\cn Devc:lopment, LLC. ace 
entities wholly owned by my wife and mo. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CRAfG VAN ENGELEN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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4. In November andlor December 2004~ I, had meetings with Dale Sullivan of Washington 
federal Bank In which Washington Federal made overtures to repair our relationship and 
solicit our business. 
S. In early 200S, I had conversations with Bryarl Churchill about loans for the purchase of 
the CalTiage Hill 3 and 4 Property. As J testified in my deposition, I told Mr. Churchill: 
UThis is what it's going to take for you to get our business, and it's going to have to have 
these three elements, -I I.e. ten percent down) fl $50,000 interest reserve, and 110 personal 
gulU'antees. 
6. This was important to me' because at that time) we had decided on a policy of not signing 
personal guarantees; also, other banks had submitted proposals not reqUiring personal 
guarantees. 
7. Mr. Churchill subsequently told me that the Washington Federal Wl'lS willing to move 
forward whh no personal guarantees. 
8. At closing on the loans for the purchase of th" Carriage Hill 3 and 4 property by 
Northwest Development Company, LLe, in February 2005, we confl.m\ed this with the 
Washington Federal personnel who were present at clOSing, and were assured by these 
individuals thQt no personal gulU'anr.ee was necessary because of the good standing of our 
businesses and our reputation. 
9. As we proceeded with the Carriage Hill project, including the construction of homes 
thereon, we caused Van Enge/en Development, LLC, to enter into later loans with 
WQshington Federal, including the six: roans at issue in this case. 
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10. Other than to confirm my signature, Washington Federal did not depose me about these 
later loans that are the very subject of its lawsuit. but only those entered into in February 
2005. 
It. As I had previously communicated to Washington Federal on numerous occasions, it was 
important to me that loans not be subject to a personal guarantee. As with the laMs in 
Pebruary 2005, when we signed the later loans we were nor required to sign personal 
guarantees, these later loans contained no reference to any personal guarantee, and 
Washington Federal personnel did not inform us that these later loans were subject to a 
personal guarantee. 
12. We had no reason to think that any personal uuarantee applied to these later loans 
because: (1) we had previously communicated to the Bank that one of the prerequisites 
for our business was no personal guarantee; (2) we had confirmed this with respect to the 
loans in February 2005; (3) with respect to the loans in February 2005, Washington 
Federal had twice lold us that no personal guarantee would apply; (4) the later 103l1s were 
substantially for the same prq,iect (Carriage Hill); and (5) Washington Federal never 
mentioned or contended that, contrary to the agreemen[ made in February 2005. these 
later loans would be subject to iI personal guarantee. 
DATED this,,2.J dllyofOctober, 20]0. 
G~ 
H. Craig Van Eogelen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me Ihis~J # of October. 20 .-----., 
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P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ill 83701 
o U.S.Mail 
g.pacsimile (208) 336-5956 o Hand Delivery o Overnight Delivery 
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Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
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WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
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MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, by and through its 
counsel of record, and pursuant to Rules 12(f) and 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
respectfully moves this Court for an Order striking portions of the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig 
Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 27, 2010. 
Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an order striking the language in paragraph 6 of said supplemental 
affidavit reading: " ... other banks had submitted proposals not requiring personal guarantees." 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND TO SHORTEN TIME - Page 1 
ORIGINAL 
Plaintiff further requests the Court, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to allow this matter to be argued at the time set for hearing upon the pending Motion For 
Summary Judgment, on October 28, 2010, at 3:30 p.m. 
This Motion is filed contemporaneously with Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Strike. 
Dated this 28 th day of October, 2010. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled 
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Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
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J. DAV/O NAVARRO, Cllitrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
) 











IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
-----------------------------) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS ("Washington 
Federal"), by and through its counsel of record, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike filed simultaneously herewith. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen have opposed Washington Federal's Motion 
for Summary Judgment in reliance upon the Affidavits Craig and Kristen Van Engelen filed on May 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE- Page 1 
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13, 2010 and the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen ("Supplemental Affidavit") filed on 
October 27,2010, along with the various deposition transcripts on file before the Court. 
In its Motion, Washington Federal objects to a specific portion of paragraph 6 of the 
Supplemental Affidavit that reads" " ... other banks had submitted proposals not requiring personal 
guarantees." Washington Federal requests that the Court strike said portion of the Supplemental 
Affidavit as inadmissible hearsay and that the Court exclude any argument offered by the Defendants 
relying upon said inadmissible evidence for the purposes of Washington Federal's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The identified portion of the Supplemental Affidavit is inadmissible hearsay and should be 
stricken. Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part: "Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein." (emphasis added). In considering evidence presented either in support of or in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits 
or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." 
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24,28 (Ct.App.1992) citing Petricevich v. Salmon River 
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,869,452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969). (emphasis added). In sum, the threshold 
question of admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions must be first determined 
by the trial court prior to ruling upon a motion for summary jUdgment. Ryan, 123 Idaho at 45-46, 
Hecla Mining Co., v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). 
I.R.E. 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE- Page 2 
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testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." LR.E. 
802 reads: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules promulgated 
by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." 
In this instance, the Defendants have advanced reliance arguments that are solely premised 
upon unsubstantiated, oral assertions that other lending institutions submitted "stronger proposals" 
not requiring personal guarantees. 1 Further, the Defendants allege that said proposals were in writing 
but are probably now somewhere in a landfil1.2 These oral assertions by the Defendants of other 
written proposals are classic examples of hearsay as they are offered for no other purpose than to say 
they had "stronger offers" from other banks that did not require personal guarantees. Further, none 
of the hearsay exceptions pursuant to LR.E. 803 are available or applicable to the Defendants. The 
Defendants have produced no admissible evidence to support their reliance arguments or to 
otherwise assert they were induced to change positions regarding their contention that they could 
obtain loans from other lending institutions without the requirement of a personal guaranty. 
Accordingly, Washington Federal requests that its Motion to Strike be granted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Washington Federal requests that its Motion to Strike be 
granted and that the above-identified portion of the Supplemental Affidavit be stricken. Further, 
Washington Federal requests that any argument offered by the Defendants in their opposition to 
Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment in reliance upon said hearsay evidence be 
I ~~ 9 and 11, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen, ~ 9 of Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van 
Engelen depo. pg. 26-28; ~ 6 of Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen. 
2Craig Van Engelen depo. Pgs, 27, 44. 
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disregarded and/or stricken by the Court as inadmissible. 
Dated this 28th day of October, 2010. 
c~-
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Thomas A. Banducci (lSB No. 2453) 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312) 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara Labrum (ISB No. 7177) 
dlabrum@bwslmvgroup.com 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 
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Telephone (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile (208) 342·4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, Case No. CV ~OC 0917209 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN 
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRJEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
County of Ada ) 
): S3 
State of Idaho ) 
H. Craig Van Engelen, fIrst being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows: 
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a Defendant in the above-captioned case. 
3. My wife, Kristen Van Engelen and 1 are the sole owners of several entities. 
Northwest Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC are 
only two of several entities that we own. 
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4. When Washington Federal Savings ("the Bank") approached me in late 2004 to 
solicit business from me and Kristen, they were not soliciting business from any 
particular entity; they were soliciting business from any of the entities I owned jointly 
with Kristen. When it approached me, thl~ Bank made clear that it wanted a 
relationship with me and Kristen so that it could have access to loaning money to all 
of the entities we controlled. 
5. When I first had discussions with Brian Churchill about loans for the Carriage Hill 
project, Kristen and I had not detennined which of our several entities would be 
involved in the development of that projel~t or if a new entity would be used to 
develop the project. Much of the decision as to which entity we would use had to do 
with tax planning. As it turned out, Northwest Development Company, LLC, and 
Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the development of the Carriage 
Hill project. 
6. Dill'ing those discussions with Mr. Churchill, I made it very clear that Kristen and I 
would not cause any of our entities to do business with the Bank if doing so required 
us to personally guaranty any loans. Because of our previous bad experience with the 
Bank, I was very demanding about the conditions under which we would do future 
business with the Bank. Around that time I had also decided after talking with another 
developer that if possible I would not personally guarantee any further loans. While 
times were good, this policy worked. In that regard, during the conversations with 
Brian Churchill regarding loans for the Carriage Hill project, he never mentioned that 
we had signed continuing personal guarantees on behalf of some of our entities, 
including both Northwest Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen 
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Development, LLC. Instead he assured me that personal guarantees would not be 
required for future loans. 
7. As discllssed in my deposition, at that time J was not willing to enter into any loans 
with the Bank on behalf of any of my entities if doing so required Kristen and me to 
personally guaranty such loans. It didn't matter to me which of my wholly-owned 
entities took out the toan, Kristen and I simply were not willing to guaranty any loans 
made by the Bank. We believed that the property we were using as collateral, at the 
time, was more than sufficient to protect the Bank should a default arise. 
8. Since my first affidavit, I have been able 10 review the Bank's documents. Before 
that time, we did not have many documents concerning our dealings with the Bank in 
our possession because the documents had been lost over the course of several moves. 
Upon reviewing the Bank's documents, I realized that the first two loans for the 
Carriage Hill development were made to ~\Jorthwest Development, LLC, not Van 
Engelen Development, LLC as I originally recalled. At the time of my first affidavit, 
I thought all of the loans for the Carriage Hill project were made to Van Engelen 
Development, LLC. In any event, we were assured by the Bank that the first two 
loans would not have personal guarantees attached to them. The Bank made these 
assurances despite their knowledge that my wife and r had signed continuing 
guarantees covering any loans made to Northwest Development, LLC. 
9. We subsequently caused another one of our entities, Van Engelen Development, 
LLC, to take out the loans at issue in the instant lawsuit for the further development 
of the Carriage Hill project. I cannot recall why we switched to Van Engelen 
Development, LLC from Northwest Dev1;:iopment, LLC for the at-issue loans. To 
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Kristen and me, it really was immaterial which entity took out the loans, because our 
policy as I stated in my deposition was still the same: we would not take out any 
loans on behalf of any of our entities if we had to personally guaranty those loans. 
This was made clear to the Bank in our initial conversations as well as in 1ater 
conversations. 
10. Despite making it clear that we would not take out any loans if we had to personal1y 
guaranty such loans, the Bank never disclosed to us that the loans would be 
personally guaranteed. At no time during the negotiations and closings for any of the 
loans taken out by entities owned by me and my wife after those initial conversations 
in late 2004/early 2005, did anyone from the Bank infonn us that we had already 
signed guarantees and that those guarantees would apply to the new loans taken out 
by our entities between 2005 and 2007. Because we had been previously told that the 
loans we caused our businesses to borrow would not be guaranteed, I believed that 
the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not guaranteed by Kristen and me. Indeed, we 
caused Van Engelen Development, LLC 10 borrow the money from the Bank in 
reliance on the Bank's representations tha.t the loans would not be guaranteed. 
11. Had we been told that any of those loans were personally guaranteed, we would not 
have caused our wholly-owned entities to take out those loans, which include the 
loans at-issue in this case that were taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC. 
We plainly were not interested in doing any business with the Bank if it required 
personal guarantees. 
12. The Bank's current position that the loans it made to Van Engelen Development, LLC 
in 2006 and 2007 are personally guaranteed is completely contrary to the position the 
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Bank took with me when it solicited business from my wife and I in late 2004 and 
early 2005. 
DATED this g day of November. 2010. 
-
H. Craig Van Engelen 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN before me thiH :.5 day of November. 2010 
----~-~~~~~~ " .. ~;.~.,. KEElY K. ODELL 
A~~;:f\ NOlary Public, State of Texas 
~';'" ~ .1.:1 My Commission Expires 
"'::!.~w.y.:~" MAY 17. 2013 
lIooo=-~ .... '=-~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
SUPPLEMENT ~L BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the 
Van Engelens"), by and through their counsel of record, submit this Supplemental Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the Court's request. This brief is 
supported by the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "3 rd Craig Aff."). 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 68 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 28,2010, this Court requested that the parties present supplemental brieting 
on the applicability of the statute of frauds and to clarify any misunderstanding regarding the 
facts. See 10/28/2010 Transcript of Proceedings attached hereto as Ex. A. In their amended 
answer and in their opposition brief, the Van Engelens raised the defenses of waiver, equitable 
estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Each of those defenses are either exceptions to the statute of frauds or are defenses to 
which the statute of frauds simply does not apply. Therefore, although the guarantees are 
governed by the statute of frauds, the USA Fertilizer case and the statute of frauds principles 
raised in that case do not act as a bar to the Van Engelens' defenses. Moreover, as is shown 
below, the Bank's misrepresentations concerning whether loans taken out by entities owned by 
the Van Engelens were not limited to loans taken out by Northwest Development, LLC. The 
representations concerning the loans taken out by Northwest Development, LLC, however, are 
relevant to the course of conduct that led to the Van Engelens' decision to cause Van Engelen 
Development, LLC to take out the loans at issue in this case. 
II. ARGUMENT 
At the outset, it is important to note that because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, 
the facts must be liberally construed in favor of the Van Engelens. Mackay v. Four Rivers 
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Indeed, the Court must "draw all 
reasonable inferences from the record in favor of [the Van Engelens]." Hecla }v1ining Co. v. Star-
lvlorning klining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). 
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A. The Bank's Misrepresentations Concerning the Personal Guarantees Extended to 
Loans to Both Northwest Development and Van Engelen Development. 
At the hearing, the Court commented that it did not believe any representations 
concerning loans made to Northwest Development, LLC were relevant to this case since the 
loans at issue were made to Van Engelen Development, LLC. From the Court's comments it 
appears that the Court misunderstands the facts and that further clarification is necessary. 
Therefore, pursuant to the Court's offer, the Van Engelens will now clarify the negotiations and 
representations leading up to the loans that are at issue in this lawsuit and explain why those 
negotiations and representations are relevant to the matter at hand. 
First, it is important to clarify that when Washington Federal Savings ("the Bank") 
approached Craig Van Engelen in 2004, it approached him to solicit business from the Van 
Engelens, not from any particular entity the Van Engelens owned. (Affidavit of Craig Van 
Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Craig Aff.") at ~ 7; 3rd 
Craig Aff. at '14.) The Van Engelens own several entities through which they develop real 
property. (Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter 
"Labrum Atl") ~ 6, Ex. D (Deposition Transcript of Henry Craig Van Engelen (hereinafter 
"Craig Depo")) at 6:5-12:4; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 3.) Northwest Development, LLC and Van 
Engelen Development, LLC are only two of those entities. (Jd) 
The Van Engelens had not done business with the Bank for a couple of years due to a 
previous bad experience, and thus were not eager to do business with the Bank again. (Craig 
Aff. at ~ 6.) Consequently, they were demanding about the terms on which they would do 
business with the Bank in the future. Indeed, they would not do any future business with the 
Bank if doing so required personal guarantees. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 6-7; Craig Depo at 34:23-
35: 19.) In that regard, after a conversation with another developer in 2005, Craig Van EngeJen 
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detennined that he would no longer cause any of his businesses to take out loans that were 
backed by personal guarantees. (Craig Depo. at 40: 15-41: 18.) While this policy worked during 
the housing boom, it had to be re-evaluated after the crash of the real estate market. (3rd Craig 
Aff. at ~ 6.) Craig Van Engelen made this policy clear to the Bank. (Id. at ~~ 6-7; Craig Depo at 
34:23-35: 19.) 
In early 2005, the Van Engelens began developing the Carriage Hill project. (Craig Aff. 
at ~ 8.) At the time that Craig Van Engelen first discussed the project with Brian Churchill from 
the Bank, the Van Engelens had not decided which of their various entities would develop the 
project. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 5.) However, in those initial conversations it was discussed that the 
loans for the project would not be guaranteed. (Id. at ~~ 5-7; Craig Aff. at 'l,r 10-12.) It was not 
until later that it was decided that the first two loans for the project would be taken out by 
Northwest Development, LLC. (3rd Craig AfT at ~ 5.) As it turned out, Northwest 
Development Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the 
development of the Carriage Hill project and both borrowed money from the Bank for the 
project. (Id.) 
Thus, the relationship the Bank was seeking when it made its representations was a 
relationship with the Van Engelens, not any particular entity owned by the Van Engelens. And 
in that regard Craig Van Engelen told Brian Churchill that for the Bank to get the Van Engelens' 
business it would need to make the loan to the Van Engelen businesses without personal 
guaranties from the Van Engelens. (Craig Depo at 34:23-35:19; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 5-7.) 
Churchill responded by assuring the Van Engelens that personal guarantees would not be 
required for future loans from the Bank. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 6; Craig Depo. 34:4-36: 11.) The 
representation was reaffirmed during the closings for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development. 
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(3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 8.) In fact, Gloria Henson from the Bank specifically told the Van Engelens 
that no guaranties were required because the Van Engelens had done business with the Bank for 
so many years with a successful track record. (Craig Depo at 32:20-33:9.) 
The Van Engelens subsequently caused another one of their entities, Van Engelen 
Development, LLC, to take out the loans for the further development of the Carriage Hill project. 
(3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 9.) Those loans are the loans at issue in this lawsuit. (ld.) The 
Van Engelens cannot recall why they switched to Van Engelen Development, LLC from 
Northwest Development, LLC for the at-issue loans. (Craig Depo. at 47:8-21.) However, to 
them it was immaterial which entity took out the loans, because of their stated policy to the Bank 
that they would not take out any loans on behalf of any of their entities if they had to personally 
guarantee those loans. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 7.) After reaffirming that the loans were not 
guaranteed during the closing of the Northwest Development, LLC loans, the Bank failed to 
inform the Van Engelens of their new position that the subsequent loans to Van Engelen 
Development, LLC for the same project would be personally guaranteed. (ld. at 'J~ 9-10.) 
As with the Northwest Development loans, the Bank never disclosed to the Van Engelens 
during any negotiations for the at-issue loans to Van Engelen Development, LLC and the 
closings of those loans that the loans would be personally guaranteed. (ld.) Indeed, at no time 
during the negotiations and closings for any of the loans taken out by entities owned by the Van 
Engelens after those initial conversations in late 2004/eariy 2005, did anyone from the Bank 
inform them that they had already signed guarantees and that those guarantees would apply to 
the new loans taken out by their entities between 2005 and 2007.' (3rd Craig Aff. at 'J~6-11; 
Craig Aff. at ~~ 11-20; Craig Depo. at 18:23-19:3,20:20-2110,21:20-22:19; 42:4-14.) Because 
they had been previously told that the loans they caused their businesses to borrow would not be 
I Notably, the Bank does not dispute this fact. 
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guaranteed, they believed that the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not guaranteed. (Jd.) 
Indeed, they caused Van Engelen Development, LLC to borrow money from the Bank in reliance 
on the Bank's representations that the loans would not be guaranteed. (Jd.) 
Thus, the representations concerning the Northwest Development loans are relevant. It 
was not until later in the negotiations that it was decided that the first two loans for the project 
would be taken out by Northwest Development, LLC. In fact, Craig Van Engelen did not 
remember that the first two loans were taken out by Northwest Development, LLC instead of 
Van Engelen Development, LLC until he reviewed the documents produced by the Bank after he 
filed his first affidavit; he originally remembered that all of the loans related to the Carriage Hill 
project were taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC. (3rd Craig AfT. at ~ 8.) 
Accordingly, this case is not about which of the two entities owned by the Van Engelens took out 
the loans because continuing guarantees had been signed as to both entities. Instead it is about 
the personal guarantees signed by the Van Engelens and the Bank's course of conduct with 
respect to those guarantees. Indeed, the Bank's conduct and representations that the first two 
loans were not guaranteed, coupled with the Bank's failure to disclose its position that the 
subsequent loans would be guaranteed, deceitfully led the Van Engelens to believe that the 
subsequent loans taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC for the same project also were 
not guaranteed. 
Because of the Van Engelens' position that they would not guarantee any loans during 
negotiations for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development, LLC, the Bank knew that the Van 
Engelens were under the misimpression that any future loans taken out by their companies were 
not subject to personal guarantee. Under those circumstances, the Bank had a duty to correct this 
misimpression. Rest. 2d Torts § 551. The Bank, however, did not disclose the subsequent loans 
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to Van Engelen Development, LLC were personally guaranteed by the Van Engelens. Thus, the 
misrepresentations made with respect to the 2005 loans to Northwest Development, LLC create 
issues of fact as to whether the 2006 and 2007 loans to Van Engelen Development were 
personally guaranteed. See also infra. Part I1.B. Accordingly, on these facts, as is shown below, 
the Court cannot enforce the guarantee against the Van Engelens. 
B. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Van EngeJens Defenses. 
At the October 28,2010, hearing, the Court indicated its belief, based on the Court's 
reading of USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 120 Idaho 271,815 P.2d 469 (Ct. App. 
1991), that statute of frauds bars the Van Engelens' defenses. The decision in USA Fertilizer, 
however, is inapposite as the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens' defenses. 
1. USA Fertilizer is Inapposite. 
The facts and legal principles at issue in USA Fertilizer are completely different from the 
t~lctS and defenses raised in the present case. First, the contract at issue in USA Fertilizer was not 
a personal guaranty, but instead was a commitment (,thirty-day letter of guarantee") to USA 
Fertilizer by the bank in that case to loan money to USA Fertilizer's customer. Id. at 272-273. 
Second, and more importantly, the defenses raised by the Van Engelens in this case of waiver, 
equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing were not at issue in USA Fertilizer. 
In that case, USA Fertilizer argued that oral conversations which took place after the 
commitment was made in writing were relevant to "clarify the parties' original understanding." 
ld. at 275. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument stating that "to the extent USA Fertilizer 
seeks to argue the evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we note that such an 
oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." Id. Here, the Van Engelens are 
not seeking to modify the personal guarantees. Instead, it is the Van Engelens' position that the 
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Bank has waived its right, or is estopped from seeking, to enforce the continuing personal 
guarantees with respect to the loans that are at issue in this lawsuit. Nowhere in the USA 
Fertilizer decision did the Court of Appeals hold that the statute of frauds bars the Van Engelens' 
defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The case simply does not apply to the facts and defenses 
at issue in the present case. 
2. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar the Van Engelens' Defenses 
As shown below, the law is clear that the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens' 
defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, unclean hands, fraud and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
a. The Van Engelens' Waiver Defense is not Barred by the Statute of 
Frauds 
The statute of frauds does not apply to this defense as this defense does not seek to 
modify an existing contract or create a new contract governed by the statute of frauds. As set 
forth in the Van Engelens' opposition brief, waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment ofa 
known right or advantage. Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 
904, 907 (1993). Waiver of a contract provision is shown when the intention to waive is clearly 
present and the party asserting the waiver shows that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and 
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley 
Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785, 788,10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000). Thus, waiver is not a modification 
of contract; it is the giving up of the right to enforce the contract. Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. 
T.B. Smith Co., 51 Idaho 710,10 P.2d 317, 322-23 (1932). 
As such, there is no case holding that the statute of frauds bars the defense of waiver. 
Indeed, the courts have recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce the terms of a 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 004t75 
written agreement governed by the statute of frauds. See Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 
Idaho 515,518-522,650 P.2d 657 (1982) (recognizing that a lessor may waive its right to 
enforce the terms ofa lease, an agreement governed by the statute of frauds). Courts have even 
recognized that a party may waive the right to enforce a clause in an agreement requiring that all 
modifications be in writing. See e.g., Rules Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Us. Bank NA., 133 Idaho 669, 
675-76,991 P.2d 857, 863-64 (Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, the statute of frauds is not a bar to 
the Van Engelens' waiver defense, and therefore the motion for summary judgment should be 
denied because there are issues of fact as to whether the Bank waived its right to enforce the 
guarantee after 2004. 
b. The Van Engelens' Equitable Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that equitable estoppel prevents a party 
from claiming that an oral promise is barred by the statute of frauds. Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 
551,563,381 P.2d 802, 809 (1963); see also Frantz v. Parke, III Idaho 1005,729 P.2d 1068 
(Ct. App. 1986). While estoppel "does not vary the statute of frauds, [it does] bar the promisor 
from raising it as a defense." Frantz, III Idaho at 1010. As set forth in the Van Engelens' 
initial brief, the elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment of a 
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the 
representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the 
representation or concealment to his prejudice. Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rei. Bd. o/Com'rs, 
147 Idaho 193,200 n. 2, 207 P.3d 169,176 n. 2 (2009). 
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Here the Bank made both false representations and concealed the existence of the 
continuing guarantee, a material fact that was central to the Van Engelens' decision to cause their 
company to enter into the loan agreements with the Banle (Craig AfI. at ~~ 13-20; Affidavit of 
Kristen Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Kristen 
Aff.") at ~~ 12-19; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 4-11.) As further clarified in the 3rd Craig Aff., filed 
concurrently herewith, the Bank solicited the Van Engelens seeking to do business with the Van 
Engelens, not any particular entity owned by the Van Engelens. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~ 4.) At that 
time, the Van Engelens were beginning to develop a project named Carriage Hill, but had not 
determined which of their several entities would be involved in the development of that project. 
(ld. at ~ 5.) As it turned out, part of the project was developed with money loaned to Northwest 
Development, LLC and another part was developed with money loaned to Van Engelen 
Development, LLC. (ld. at ~~ 8-9.) 
The Van Engelens made clear to the Bank that they would not do any future business 
with the Bank through any of their entities if they were required to personally guarantee any 
loans. (ld. at ~~ 6-10.) The Bank assured them that they would not be required to guarantee any 
loans. (ld.) While making this representation, the Bank did not disclose that the guarantees the 
Van Engelens had signed earlier on behalf of some of their entities, including Northwest 
Development, LLC and Van Engelen Development, LLC, were continuing and would by their 
terms apply to the new loans taken out by the Van Engelens on behalf of both Northwest 
Development, LLC and Van Engelen Development, LLC. (ld.) 
The circumstances show that these false representations and concealment were made with 
the intent that the Van Engelens rely on these misrepresentations and nondisclosure to cause their 
businesses to borrow money from the Bank. In light of the Bank's affirmative 
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misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required for the at-issue loans and the Bank's 
failure to disclose the existence of the guarantees at any of the loan closings, the Van Engelens 
could not have discovered that these new loans to Northwest Development, LLC and Van 
Engelen Development, LLC were covered by prior guarantees that they did not remember 
signing. The Van Engelens actually relied on these statements by causing Van Engelen 
Development, LLC to enter into the loan agreements with the Bank for the at-issue loans. (3rd 
Craig Aff. at ~~ 10-11; Craig Aff. at ~ 13-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19; Craig Depo. 27:22-28: 11.) 
Thus, because the statute of frauds is inapplicable and because there are triable issues of fact as 
to whether the Bank is estopped from enforcing the guarantee with respect to the at-issue loans, 
the Bank's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
c. The Van Engelens' Quasi Estoppel Defense is not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Quasi estoppel, like equitable estoppel, prevents the statute of frauds from being used as a 
defense to an oral promise. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437,80 P.3d 1031, 1038 
(2003) (recognizing that quasi estoppel can be used to bar application of the statute of frauds, but 
holding that the conduct at issue did not satisfy the requirements of quasi estoppel). 
Accordingly, as with equitable estoppel, if the elements of quasi estoppel are satisfied, the statute 
of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens from relying on the Bank's pledge that the new loans 
would not be guaranteed. 
As set forth in the Van Engelens' initial brief, the elements of quasi-estoppel are: (1) the 
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the 
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other 
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending 
party to maintain an inconsistent position from the one he or she has already derived a benefit or 
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acquiesced in. Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200 n. 3, 207 P.3d at 176 n. 3. There are triable issues of 
fact here precluding summary judgment as the Bank's current position that the loans are 
personally guaranteed, is completely contrary to its representations to the Van Engelens that the 
loans made after the initial meeting in late 2004 would not be guaranteed. (3rd Craig Affidavit at 
~'l 6-12; Craig Aft'. at ~ 12-19; Kristen Aft'. at ~ 12-18; Craig Depo. p. 31 :24-33 :9; Labrum Aft'. 
~ 7, Ex. E (Transcript of Deposition of Kristen Lee Van Engelen, hereinafter "Kristen Depo. ") at 
25:23-27:8 and 28: 14-23.) The Bank's position that the loans would not be guaranteed was a 
key factor in the Van Engelens' decision to cause their companies to enter into loans with the 
Bank after 2004. (3rd Craig Affidavit at ~~ 6-12; Craig Aff. at ~ 11-20; Kristen Aff. at ~ 12-19.) 
The Bank gained an advantage because it induced the Van Engelens to cause their business to 
enter loans with the Bank after the Van Engelens had determined not to do business with the 
Bank. (Craig Aft'. at ~~6, 20; 3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 6; Craig Depo at 34:23-35: 19.) It would be 
unconscionable to now permit the Bank to change its position concerning the applicability of the 
continuing guarantee to the at-issue loans after the Bank repeatedly took the position that the 
new loans would not be guaranteed. 
d. The Van Engelens' Unclean Hands Defense is not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
As with waiver, the Van Engelens do not seek to use their unclean hands defense to 
modify the continuing guarantee, but instead are using it to prevent the Bank from enforcing the 
guarantee on the ground that the Bank's conduct "has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or 
fraudulent and deceitful." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 1648, 15 P .3d 731, 739 (2005). 
Therefore, the statute of frauds does not apply to this defense. The facts as set forth above and in 
prior briefing demonstrate that there are triable issues of fact as to whether the Bank's conduct 
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful. To the extent that the 
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Bank seeks any equitable remedy in this case, the existence of genuine issues of material fact 
preclude summary judgment. 
e. The Van Engelens' FraudlMisrepresentation Defense is not Barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. 
The Bank's failure to disclose the existence of the continuing guarantee and failure to 
correct the Bank's misrepresentations that no guarantee would be required renders the guarantee 
voidable, unenforceable, and discharges the Van Engelens. See Marine Bank, Nat. Ass 'n v. Meal 
Counter, Inc., 826 F.2d 1577 (7th Cir. 1987). Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Suretyship and Guaranty summarizes this principle, stating that "[i]fthe secondary obligor's 
assent to the secondary obligation is induced by fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the 
obligee upon which the secondary obligor is justified in relying, the secondary obligation is 
voidable by the secondary obligor." Rest. 3d Sur, § 12(1). Notably, "a misrepresentation 
occurring after the execution of a continuing guaranty may render the secondary obligation 
voidable with respect to extensions of credit subsequent to the misrepresentation." Rest. 3d Sur, 
§ 12, cmt i.; see also Sumitomo Bank o/California v. Iwasaki, 447 P.2d 956, 958 (Cal. 1968) 
Because fraud renders the guaranty void, it is not a modification of the guarantee within the 
statute of frauds. Therefore, the statute of frauds has no application to the Van Engelens' fraud 
defense and summary judgment should not be granted on this defense as there are triable issues 
of fact exist concerning whether the guaranty was rendered void by the Bank's 
misrepresentations regarding the guaranty and the Bank's failure to disclose the applicability of 
the guaranty to the at-issue loans. 
f. The Van Engelens' Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defense is Not 
Barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
The statute of frauds does not bar this defense because the defense only arises as to the 
terms of the existing guaranty or the loan agreements. Idaho Power Co v. Cogeneration, Inc., 
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134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in the guaranty and the at-issue loan agreements requires the Bank to perform in good 
faith under those contracts and breach of the duty occurs when the Bank violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit under those agreements. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287,824 P.2d 841, 862 (1991). Here, the facts demonstrate that the 
Bank breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by misrepresenting that the continuing 
guarantees would not apply to the loans the Van Engelens caused their business to borrow in 
2005 through 2007. Even if those representations only involved the 2005 loans to Northwest 
Development, it would be a breach of the covenant to tell the Van Engelens that no guarantee 
applied to those loans and then not inform the Van Engelens that the prior guarantees would 
apply to the subsequent loans taken out by Van Engelen Development, LLC in 2006 and 2007 
when the loans to both Northwest Development, LLC in 2005 and Van Engelen Development, 
LLC in 2006 and 2007 were subject to personal guarantees. (3rd Craig Aff. at ~~ 8-11.) 
In that regard, as set forth in the Van Engelens' original opposition brief, a party to a 
business transaction has a duty to disclose "matters known to him that he knows to be necessary 
to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading;" and "facts 
basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to 
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or 
other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." Rest. 2d 
Torts § 55 1 (2)(b), (c), and (e). Thus, the Bank acted in bad faith by not disclosing the existence 
of the guarantees when it made the at-issue loans to Van Engelen Development in 2006 and 
2007. This is especially true after learning of the Van Engelens' position during the negotiations 
for the 2005 loans to Northwest Development that they would not personally guarantee any loans 
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from the Bank. See Rest. 2d Torts § 551 (1) ("One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he 
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is 
subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter that he has failed to disclose.") Consequently, the statute of frauds does not bar this 
defense. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the statute of frauds does not bar the Van Engelens' 
defenses and as demonstrated by the affidavits, evidence, and depositions in this case, many 
genuine issues of material fact exist which, if proven, prevent the Bank from enforcing the 
guarantee. As such, the Van Engelens respectfully ask that the Court deny the Bank's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2010. 
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I WASHINGTON FEDERAL VS. VAN ENGELEN CVOC·09·17209 
1 BOISE, IDAHO. OCTOBER 28, 2010 1 And I'd like to reset the argument and 
I 2 2 I have a date in mind. But before we do that, I 3 THE COURT: Are we ready for Van Engelen? 3 just want to make sure that I understand this 
4 All right. Before we get too far into 4 case. 
l 5 this, I'm going to ask the marshal to give both of 5 As I understand it, the Van Engelen 6 you a copy of a case. And we are actually going 6 actually had two legal entities; one of them being 
7 to continue this matter and Jet me explain why. 7 Van Engelen Development and the other one is 
I 6 Neither party brought up the statute of 8 Northwest -- whatever it's called, LLC. 
9 frauds problem that exists in this case. And I 9 To the extent that I have testimony and 
I 
10 have given you a copy of a case and I would really 10 other things regarding the second entity, the 
11 like the parties to address why the statute of 11 Northwest LLC, I think that's all irrelevant to 
12 frauds does not apply. And that's 9-505 ( 2) 12 the issues here because all we have, as I 
I 
13 And there's a case directly on point 13 understand it, six loans entered into from 2006 
14 that my understanding of it says that you cannot 14 on. And those loans were given -- were given to 
15 have an oral modification of an existing written 15 Van Enge/en Development. 
16 guarantee and that guarantees all have to be in 16 The guaranty, as I understand it, only 
17 writing or they're invalid. 17 applies to Van Englen Development and has nothing 
18 And since neither party addressed this 18 to do with Northwest LLC -- I can't remember what 
19 and it may, in fact, be dispositive of the issues, 19 it's called. Northwest--
20 I would like to give everyone the opportunity to 20 MR. BANDUCCI: Northwest Development. 
21 address it. 21 THE COURT: Northwest Development, LLC. 
22 And I would like responses from both 22 Now, that's my understanding. So when 
23 parties -- I don't see that you need to cross, you 23 we go into the motion for summary judgment, in my 
24 can just waive the cross -- by November 5th, if 24 view to the extent there are these arguments about 
25 can respond to it. 25 entations that not have 
4 
1 happened, even though I think they violate -- if 1 possibility we could have an oral argument on 
2 they did happen, they would violate the statute of 2 November 12th. sometime on the 12th? That's a 
3 frauds. 3 Friday. 
4 But to the extent that they allegedly 4 MR. WISHNEY: I can do that, Judge. 
5 happened, it's my understanding they all happened 5 MR. BANDUCCI: 1'/1 know in a second, Your 
6 with regard to Northwest Development. 6 Honor. 
7 And if not, you're going to have to 7 THE COURT: Okay. 
s prove to me - and besides that, I don't think-- 8 MR. BANDUCCI: I can, too, Your Honor. 
9 I don't think the misrepresentations -- unless I'm 9 THE COURT: Okay. What good -- what is a 
10 wrong about the statute of frauds. 10 time - what time is good for both of you? 
11 And also the fact that there is a 11 Because I can do it any time on the 12th. 
12 written -- in -- in the guaranty there's a 12 MR. WISHNEY: If I had my druthers, Your 
13 specific provision which requires the guarantors 13 Honor, it would be in the morning, 10:00 o'clock 
14 to in writing disavow any guarantee. And as far 14 or so. 
15 as I know, there's no indication of any written 15 MR. BANDUCCI: It doesn't matter to me, Your 
16 documents. 16 Honor. 
17 So I'd like you to look at this case 17 THE COURT: That sounds fine. Why don't we 
18 and tell me whether - tell me why it doesn't 18 do it 10:00 o'clock, November 12th. 
19 apply and we'll reset the oral argument. 19 And then if you can get - if you can 
20 And I apologize t6 counsel, but I don't 20 get your response and your -- how would you treat 
21 see any point in going forward until you have a 21 this particular case and the statute of frauds to 
22, chance to look at this case. 22 me by the close of business on November 5th. 
'23 Let me ask you a question. Normally I 23 MR. BANDUCCI: Very good, Your Honor. 
24 don't do things on a Friday, but Thursday, 24 THE COURT: And if I misunderstand the state 
25 November 11th is Veteran's Day. Is there of facts, this is also 
lor 2 sheets :02:141'1'1 
FEDERAL VS. VAN ENGELEN 
6 
1 know that I misunderstand the state of the facts. 
2 0 kay. Thank you. Stand in recess until 4:00. 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0917209 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to the Court's instruction at the October 28,2010 hearing on Plaintiff, Washington 
Federal Saving's ("Washington Federal") Motion for Summary Judgment, Washington Federal, by 
and through its counsel of record respectfully submits this Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Summary Judgment. 
III 
III 
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I. 
FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD 
By way of review, the relevant and undisputed facts, as established by the record are as 
follows: 
1. The Defendants, Craig and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants"), are the principals 
of Van Engelen Development, Inc.("VED,,).1 The Defendants are also the principals of Northwest 
Development, Inc. ("NWD,,).2 
2. In 2002, Washington Federal extended credit to VED in the an10unt of$126,000.00 
("2002 Loans,,).3 On August 14, 2002, the Defendants signed a personal continuing guaranty on 
behalf ofVED.4 The Continuing General Guaranty Agreement ("Guaranty"), personally guaranteed 
"payment to Lender [Washington Federal] of all Obligations that Borrower [VED] owes to Lender 
now or in the future.,,5 The Guaranty also reads in pertinent parts, as follows: 
"Written Notice Needed to Withdraw Guarantor's Promise. Guarantor's Promise 
shall be a continuing guaranty as to any present or future Obligations Borrower owes 
Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually receives written notice from 
I Craig Van Engelen depo. p. 6; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 6. 
2 Craig Van Engelen depo. p. 6; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 6. 
3 Dale Sullivan depo. pps. 64-65; ~ 3, Aff. Craig Van Engelen; ~ 3, Aff. Kristen Van 
Engelen. 
4 Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 18-19; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 9. 
5 ~ 1, Guaranty. 
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Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise.'m 
"Guarantor's Additional Waivers of Notice. Lender does not have to notify 
Guarantor of any of the following events and this will not affect Guarantors Promise. 
(a) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor of Lender's acceptance of Guarantor's 
Promise. 
(b) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor when lender lends money or extends 
other credit to Borrower or acquires Obligations of Borrower." 7 
3. The 2002 Loans were paid in full by VED approximately one year after Washington 
Federal extended the funds. 8 
4. In February 2005, Washington Federal extended credit to NWD ("2005 Loans") 
which were used by NWD for the acquisition of Phases III and IV of the Carriage Hill Subdivision 
project.9 
5. The Defendants allege that at the closing of 2005 Loans, Washington Federal 
employees (Bryan Churchill and possibly Gloria Henson) made representations that personal 
guarantees would not be required for the 2005 Loans.lo 
6. In a series of six real estate development loans totaling $6,225,860.97, Washington 
Federal extended credit to VED, with the first ofthese loans closing on January 18,2006 and the last 
closing on March 28, 2007 ("2006-2007 Loans"). I I 
6 ~ 3, Guaranty. 
7 ~ 7, Guaranty. 
8 ~ 5, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 5, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen. 
9 ~ 13, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 12, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen; Craig Van Engelen 
depo. pps. 26-27; 34, 37, 38-39. 
10 ~ 15, Aff. of Craig Van Engelen; ~ 14, Aff. of Kristen Van Engelen. 
II ~ 4, Complaint, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to deposition to Craig Van Engelen. 
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7. VED eventually defaulted on the 2006-2007 Loans. 12 Following foreclosure of the 
collateral securing these loans, and after applying all credits and debits, a balance of$4,452,809.67 
remains due and owing. 13 The Defendants have not paid any part of this balance due. 14 
8. The Defendants have never delivered written notice of the withdrawal of their 
respective guarantees ofloans extended to VED.15 Further, there is no other writing in existence that 
would otherwise modify the continuing Guaranty for any and all loans extended by Washington 
Federal to VED. 
9. The only recovery sought by Washington Federal in the above-captioned lawsuit 
relates to the remaining deficiency for the 2006-2007 Loans extended to VED, not the 2002 Loans 
to VED, nor the 2005 Loans extended to NWD.16 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
In addition to the arguments presented in its prior summary judgment briefings, this Court 
must grant Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) any alleged oral 
modification ofthe Guaranty is, as a matter oflaw, barred by Idaho's statute of frauds, Idaho Code 
§ 9-505(2); and (2) under the terms of the Guaranty, the Defendants expressly waived any rights 
contrary to the Guaranty agreement. 
12 , , 3-6, Aff. of Bryan Churchill; p. 6, line 8, Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
13 "7-12, Aff. of Bryan Churchill. 
15 Craig Van Engelen depo. pps. 19-20; Kristen Van Engelen depo. p. 31. 
16 , 4, Complaint, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 6 to deposition to Craig Van Engelen. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - PAGE 4 
00490 
A. Idaho's Statute of Frauds Bars Oral Modifications of Guarantees. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Defendants' allegations of misrepresentation and/or 
concealment in relation to the NWD/2005 Loans are irrelevant for the purposes of this lawsuit as 
pertaining to the VED/2006-2007 Loans, Idaho law precludes oral modifications of guarantees. 
Idaho Code § 9-505 reads in part as follows: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his 
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing 
or secondary evidence of its contents: 
(2) A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except 
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code. 
In USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, 120 Idaho 271, 276, 815 P.2d 469,474 
(Ct.App.1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that oral modifications ofa guarantee are barred 
under the foregoing provisions of the statute offrauds. In USA Fertilizer, the Defendant-Bank issued 
an irrevocable letter of credit guarantee in the amount of $15,000.00 in favor of Plaintiff-fertilizer 
company for a term of30 days for a Shelley, Idaho farmer, Mr. Sterling Smith. Id. at 272. The bank 
argued that it issued the letter of credit guaranty solely for the purpose of ensuring that the plaintiff 
would not be "left hanging" pending the approval and processing of the operating loan and that once 
the operating loan was approved, the plaintiff could no longer look to the letter of credit, but only 
to the funds available for payment from the approved operating loan. Id. at 274-75. 
The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that an additional "interpretation" of the 30 day letter of credit 
guaranty was provided by a bank representative, which further clarified the parties' original 
understanding of the letter of credit. Id. at 275. The Plaintiff alleged that during this phone call, the 
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bank representative's "interpretation" allowed the plaintiff to demand payment any time Mr. Smith's 
account was thirty days late and thus morphed into a continuing guarantee extending to all unpaid 
billings incurred through the 1987 crop season (as opposed to just the initial application of fertilizer 
to Mr. Smith's fields). Id at 273-275. In a footnote, the Court made an important distinction that 
"evidence of the parties" subsequent conduct may be admissible to explain or clarify the meaning 
intended by the parties to a contract. However, this principle is pertinent to issues involving the 
applicability of the parol evidence exclusionary rule; it does not apply to avoid the operation of the 
statute offrauds." Id. at 275. (emphasis added). The Court further held that to the extent plaintiff 
sought to argue that this "evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we note that such 
an oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." Id at 275. 
In the case at bar, the Defendants seek to nullify the Guaranty based upon (i) allegations that 
Washington Federal orally agreed they would not be required to guaranty the NWD/2005 Loans, and 
(2) the Plaintiffs failure to disclose the existence of the guaranties during closing ofthe 2006-2007 
Loans to VED. In each instance, the Defendants are asking the Court to allow oral modification of 
the Guaranty. The first argument necessarily relies upon an alleged oral modification of the explicit 
provision of the guaranty which requires written notice of any withdrawal thereof by the guarantor. 
The second argument similarly relies upon oral statements to modify the provisions of the guaranty 
wherein the guarantors specific waived notice of (a) Washington Federal's acceptance of the 
Defendants' promise to pay, and (b) any loans extended to VED. Based upon Idaho Code §9-505, 
as interpreted in USA Fertilizer, the Defendants' arguments are fatally flawed, as a matter oflaw, 
and the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 
In an effort to mend their misplaced allegations of misrepresentations and concealment as 
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to the 2005 Loans to NWD, the Defendants, by way ofMr. Van Engelen's Supplemental Affidavit 
in Opposition to Summary Judgment, attempt to marry the 2005 Loans with the 2006-2007 Loans 
because VED and NWD are entities wholly owned by the Defendants and because the 2005 Loans 
and the "later loans were substantially for the same project."17 On the one hand, the Defendants want 
to use their beneficial corporate entity status as a shield for liability purposes, yet on the other hand 
use it as a sword to say that VED and NWD are essentially one in the same (which lends itself more 
to a piercing the corporate veil argument). The Defendants cannot have it both ways. The simple, 
undisputed facts are that the Defendants' allegations of misrepresentation and/or concealment, even 
ifproven, apply to the 2005 Loans to NWD. Mr. Van Engelen's Supplemental Affidavit serves only 
to confirm these facts. Because Washington Federal seeks recovery for deficiency amounts on the 
2006-2007 Loans to VED and because the statute of frauds bars any oral modifications of the 
Guaranty, no affirmative defense alleged by the Defendants can stand. Therefore, this Court must 
grant Washington Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 
B. Under the Guaranty, the Defendants Expressly Waived Any Rights that are 
Contrary to the Terms of the Guaranty. 
The rights of a creditor against a guarantor are determined strictly from the terms of the 
guaranty agreement. If the guaranty is clear and unequivocal, there is no occasion for the court to 
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Rather, the intent of the parties must be derived 
from the language of the guaranty ifit is unambiguous. Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 775, 
663 P.2d 653,656 (1983); McGill v. Idaho Bank & Trust, 102 Idaho 494, 498, 632 P.2d 683, 687 
(1981); Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 319, 870 P.2d 663, 672 (Ct.App.1994); 
17 Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, "3, 12. 
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CIT Financial Services v. Herb' Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P.2d 890, 892 
(Ct.App.l990); Johnson Equipment v. Nielson, 108 Idaho 867, 871, 702 P.2d 905,909 (Ct.App. 
1985). When the guaranty is unconditional, the guarantor may not imply limitations upon the 
creditor's right to recover. CIT Financial Services v. Herb's Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 
187, 795 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct.App.l990). 
In addition to the notice waiver provisions of Section 7 of the Guaranty recited on page 3 
above, Defendants specifically and expressly waived any rights that are contrary to the express terms 
of the Guaranty under paragraph 14 thereof, to wit: 
Guarantor's Wavier of Any Rights Contrary to This Agreement. Whenever this 
agreement permits Lender to do something or not do something and Guarantor has 
some legal right to the contrary, Guarantor expressly waives that right. 
Idaho courts have consistently upheld these types of waivers. See e.g., Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 
Idaho 772, 774-76, 663 P.2d 653, 655-57 (1983); Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 324 & 
325,647 P.2d 776, 780 & 781 (Ct.App.l982); and Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 
894,606 P.2d 993, 998 (1980). Therefore, there exists no duty on behalf of Washington Federal to 
disclose to the Defendants further extensions of credit made to VED or that such loans were backed 
by the Guaranty. Any argument presented by the Defendants that these terms/waivers of the 
Guaranty were orally modified between the parties would be barred under the statute of frauds as 
outline above. 
The Defendants' argument that Washington Federal somehow had a duty to continually 
disclose the continuing Guaranty for the mUltiple loans extended to VED is baseless and not 
sustainable under Idaho law. As the Defendants have waived any rights contrary to any terms of the 
Guaranty, their affirmative defenses are, as a matter of law, without merit and summary judgment 
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must be granted in favor of Washington Federal. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, together with Washington Federal's prior summary judgment 
briefing and the file on record before the Court, Washington Federal requests an order for summary 
judgment in its favor as to the relief sought in its Complaint. 
-Respectfully submitted this !::::::> day of November, 2010. 
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MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VIT 
OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN 
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, by and through its 
counsel of record, and pursuant to Rules 12(1) and 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
respectfully moves this Court for an Order striking the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support 
of Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on November 3,2010. 
Plaintiff further requests the Court, pursuant to Rule 6( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, to allow this matter to be argued at the time set for hearing upon the pending Motion For 
Summary Judgment, on November 12,2010, at 10:00 a.m. 
This Motion is filed contemporaneously with Plaintifr s Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Strike. 
Dated this -1- day of November, 2010. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDA VIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN 
SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("Defendants" or "the Van 
Engelens") oppose the Motion of Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal" 
or "Plaintiff') to strike the Affidavit of Craig V an Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("the 3rd Affidavit"). 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN SUPPO 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I I 
A. The Affidavit is Timely Because its Submission was Invited by the Court 
The Plaintiff complaints that the 3rd Affidavit is untimely under Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
However, as the Plaintiff well knows, submission of materials clarifying the facts was invited by 
the Court. This is entirely permissible, because a court may modify the time period for 
submission of affidavits under Rule 56(c). Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & 
Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,5,981 P.2d 236,240 (1999). 
On October 28,2010, this matter was slated for a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary judgment. Rather than hearing the argument of counsel, the Court directed counsel to 
case law concerning the Statute of Frauds, and requested additional briefing regarding its 
potential applicability.' At that hearing, the Court also described its understanding ofthe state of 
the underlying facts, particularly as they pertained to statements made to the Defendants by the 
Plaintiffs in the context ofloans made to the Van Engelen's two entities, Northwest 
Developments, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC. The Court stated that "to the extent 
that [the statements] allegedly happened, it's my understanding that they all happened with 
regard to Northwest Development." (Hearing Transcript, October 28, 2010, p. 4.) At that 
hearing, the Court explicitly stated: "and if I misunderstand the state of facts, this is also your 
opportunity to let me know that I misunderstand the state of facts." (Hearing Transcript, October 
28,2010, p. 5-6.) This is the purpose of the 3rd Affidavit, which clarifies that, at the time the 
statements were made, the Plaintiff was not soliciting business from any particular entity (3 rd 
Affidavit at ~ 4); that at the time discussions were had concerning particular loans, the Van 
Engelens had not yet determined which of their several entities would be involved, (3 rd Affidavit 
at ~ 5); and that the Defendants had made it clear that they would not cause any of their entities 
to do business with the Plaintiff if doing so required a personal guaranty, (3 rd Affidavit at ~ 6.) 
I As the Defendants explained in their supplemental briefing, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable. 
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As this 3rd Affidavit was expressly invited by the Court, the Defendants did not need to seek 
additional leave of the Court to file a motion to file the affidavit or otherwise seek permission 
from the Court to do so. 
B. The Affidavit Does not Contain Information on New Subjects 
Contrary to the Plaintiffs assertion otherwise, the 3rd Affidavit does not contain "new 
allegations of fact," but is merely clarifying of facts previously presented. The case Sun Valley 
Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,981 P.2d 236 (1999), which the 
Plaintiff cited but did not analyze for factual similarity with the present case, is instructive. Sun 
Valley Potatoes was a legal malpractice case in which a client sued its former attorney for not 
presenting three pieces of evidence that may have reduced the damages award that the client was 
required to pay. On a motion for summary judgment, former attorney initially only presented 
evidence that he had actually presented one of the three evidentiary issues. However, he did not 
address the other two pieces of allegedly mitigating evidence. Then, three days before the 
hearing, the former attorney submitted an affidavit asserting for the first time that the decision 
not to present the other two pieces of evidence had been calculated trial decisions. The Supreme 
Court determined that consideration of this late filed affidavit was inappropriate because it "was 
not a supplement to the earlier factual showing made in support of its motion, but rather 
presented new and different factual information." ld., 133 Idaho at 6, 981 P.2d at 241. 
The circumstances that existed in Sun Valley Potatoes do not exist in this case. For 
example, using Paragraph 5 of the 3rd Affidavit, Mr. Van Engelen explains that when he first 
discussed financing with the Plaintiff, he had not yet determined which entity would take the 
loan, and he made it clear that they would not cause any entity to take out a loan if a personal 
guarantee was required. Unlike Sun Valley Potatoes, this is not new evidence, but is merely 
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clarifying of evidence previously presented in the Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 27, 2010 ("the 2nd Affidavit.) 
In the 2nd Affidavit, Mr. Van Engelen stated, much as he does in the 3rd Affidavit, that "I told Mr. 
Churchill: 'This is what it's going to take for you to get our business, and it's going to have to 
have these three elements,' i.e ten percent down, a $50,000 interest reserve, and no personal 
guarantees." (2nd Affidavit at ~ 5.) In both affidavits, Mr. Van Engelen describes how the 
Defendants had determined not to proceed with any loan from Plaintiff unless Plaintiff would 
agree to not require a personal guarantee. Each of the assertions in Mr. Van Engelen's 3rd 
Affidavit are likewise on factual subjects that he had previously addressed in the 2nd Affidavit; 
the Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 
13,2010 (l st Affidavit); and/or the Deposition of Craig Van Engelen (Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. Dl It is clear that unlike Sun Valley 
Potatoes, Mr. Van Engelen's 3rd Affidavit does not contain late evidence on new subjects, but is 
merely clarifying of previously presented subjects in order to assist the Court in understanding 
the case - precisely as the Court requested. 
2 Compare the following: 
3rd Affidavit 2nd Affidavit I sl Affidavit Craig Van Engelen Deposition 
~I ~I ~I 
~2 ~2 
~3 ~3 ~2 p. 6:1- 9:24 
,4 ,4 ~7 
~5 ~~5, 6 
,6 ~~5, 6 ~~11, 14 p.40:16-41:I8 
,7 "5, II p. 40: I6-4l:l8 
~8 ~12 ~~II, 14, 15 
~9 ~9 ~ II _,10 '~Il, 12 
~11 ~~ 5,6,7,8, ,20 
II, 12 
~I2 "4,5,7,8, '~7, II, 14 
II, 12 
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As the subjects of the 3rd Affidavit were actually contained in the earlier submissions of 
evidence, the Plaintiff's complaint of prejudice cannot stand. Furthermore, unlike Sun Valley 
Potatoes, where prejudice was found when the affidavit was submitted only three days prior to 
the hearing, the 3rd Affidavit was submitted seven days prior to the hearing, which has been 
rescheduled for November 12,2010. Plaintiff nevertheless argues that it is prejudiced because of 
certain inconsistencies between the 1 st Affidavit and the 3rd Affidavit. It even goes so far as to 
malign the honesty of Defendants by accusing them of "speak [ing] out of both sides of [ their] 
mouth" because of this earlier inconsistency. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 
Affidavit, p. 6.) This is both offensive and inappropriate. Defendants are not trying to mislead 
the Court, but are taking steps to correct their faulty memories. As has been testified to, 
Defendants were business owners who owned many entities and were engaged in many 
complicated real estate transactions. (Craig Van Engelen Depo., p. 6: 1 - 9:24.) The 1 st 
Affidavit, which contained the inconsistency of which the Plaintiff now complains, was filed 
prior to the Defendants' opportunity to review the Plaintiff's documentation in discovery. As 
Defendants have frankly admitted, their memory was incorrect in the 1 st Affidavit; indeed, this is 
the reason that Defendants have made their recent submissions, including the 3rd Affidavit. (3 rd 
Affidavit ~ 8.) More significantly, however, Plaintiffs have neglected to mention that 
Defendants corrected this error in the 2nd Affidavit, which was submitted prior to the 
submission of the Plaintiff's Replv to the present Motion. As such, Plaintiff's complaint of 
prejudice from such inconsistency cannot stand. 
C. The 3rd Affidavit Does not Contain Hearsay 
The Plaintiff complains that Paragraphs 5, 7, 9, and 10 of the 3rd Affidavit contain 
inadmissible hearsay statements made by Kristen Van Engelen. Hearsay is, of course, "a 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VIT OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 00502 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifYing at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Idaho R. Evid. 80lCc) (emphasis added). 
These paragraphs do not purport to memorialize any statement whatsoever. These paragraphs 
state as follows: 
5. When I first had discussions with Brian Churchill about loans for 
the Carriage Hill project, Kristen and I had not determined which of our several 
entities would be involved in the development of that project or if a new entity 
would be used to develop the project. Much of the decision as to which entity we 
would use had to do with tax planning. As it turned out, Northwest Development 
Company, LLC, and Van Engelen Development, LLC were both used in the 
development of the Carriage Hill project. 
7. As discussed in my deposition, at that time I was not willing to 
enter into any loans with the Bank on behalf of any of my entities if doing so 
required Kristen and me to personally guaranty such loans. It didn't matter to me 
which of my wholly-owned entities took out the loan, Kristen and I simply were 
not willing to guaranty any loans made by the Bank. We believed that the 
property we were using as collateral, at the time, was more than sufficient to 
protect the Bank should a default arise. 
9. We subsequently caused another one of our entities, Van Engelen 
Development, LLC, to take out the loans at issue in the instant lawsuit for the 
further development of the Carriage Hill project. I cannot recall why we switched 
to Van Engelen Development, LLC from Northwest Development, LLC for the 
at-issue loans. To Kristen and me, it really was immaterial which entity took out 
the loans, because our policy as I stated in my deposition was still the same: we 
would not take out any loans on behalf of any of our entities if we had to 
personally guaranty those loans. This was made clear to the Bank in our initial 
conversations as well as in later conversations. 
10. Despite making it clear that we would not take out any loans if we 
had to personally guaranty such loans, the Bank never disclosed to us that the 
loans would be personally guaranteed. At no time during the negotiations and 
closings for any of the loans taken out by entities owned by me and my wife after 
those initial conversations in late 2004/early 2005, did anyone from the Bank 
inform us that we had already signed guarantees and that those guarantees would 
apply to the new loans taken out by our entities between 2005 and 2007. Because 
we had been previously told that the loans we caused our businesses to borrow 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG V AN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF 
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would not be guaranteed, I believed that the loans at issue in this lawsuit were not 
guaranteed by Kristen and me. Indeed, we caused Van Engelen Development, 
LLC to borrow the money from the Bank in reliance on the Bank's 
representations that the loans would not be guaranteed. 
To be hearsay, the declarant must transmit another speaker's out of court statement. 
These paragraphs do not contain any out of court statements whatsoever, much less purport to 
recount out of court statements made by Kristen Van Engelen. As such, the Plaintiff s assertion 
that these paragraphs contain inadmissible hearsay is both baffling and bizarre. 
It appears that the Plaintiff also argues that these paragraphs of the 3rd Affidavit are on 
matters outside of Mr. Van Engelen's knowledge because he is "speculating" about the thoughts 
of his wife and business partner, Kristen Van Engelen. To the contrary, Mr. Van Engelen 
explains Kristen and he had made certain business decisions together. Paragraph 5 discusses that 
they had not determined which entity that they would use in the development of the project. This 
requires no speculation about Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but is simply a statement 
of fact within Mr. Van Engelen's personal knowledge. Paragraph 7 explains that they were not 
willing to guarantee any loans made by the Bank. This requires no speculation about Kristen 
Van Engelen's private thoughts, but explains a business decision made by the partners of the 
business. Paragraph 9 reiterates their policy of not signing personal guarantees. This requires no 
speculation about Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but explains a business decision made 
by the partners of the business. Paragraph 10 explains that Mr. Van Engelen believed that the 
loans at issue were not guaranteed by Kristen or himself. This requires no speculation about 
Kristen Van Engelen's private thoughts, but it actually Mr. Van Engelen's own thoughts, a 
matter certainly within his own knowledge. 
As these paragraphs plainly do not contain hearsay and recount matters within Mr. Van 
Engelen's personal knowledge, these paragraphs are admissible and should not be struck. 
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D. Statements Made in the Affidavit are Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds 
In the final sentence of the argument section of its brief, Plaintiff argues in a perfunctory 
fashion that "to the extent paragraphs 6, 8, 10, and 12 ... seeks to introduced alleged terms of 
an oral commitment by Washington Federal to extend credit, (each loan being in excess of 
$50,000), the same are barred by Idaho Code Section 9-505(5)." (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Strike, p. 8.) Section 9-505(5) is the Statute of Frauds, which provides that certain 
agreements must be in writing to be valid. The Statute of Frauds is not an evidentiary standard 
upon which statements in an affidavit might be struck. Moreover, as explained at length in their 
Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, which is incorporated by 
reference herein as if reproduced in full, the Statute of Frauds does not bar the Van Engelen's 
defenses or bear in any way upon this case. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Motion to Strike Mr. Van 
Engelen's Affidavit. 
DATED this Ith day of November 2010. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
J 
-~:;;t;arJ 8-
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ith day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
D U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 336-5956 
D Hand Deli very 
D Overnight Delivery 
~~. fa~ 
6ara L. Parker 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG VAN ENGELEN IN SUPPORT OF ()0506 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Fax: (208) 336-5956 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SA VINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




) CASE No. CV-OC 0917209 
) 
) 








STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of Ada ) 
Bryan Churchill, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an Assistant Vice President and authorized representative of Washington 
Federal Savings, a United States Corporation, ("Washington Federal"), the named Plaintiff 
AFFIDA VIT OF INTEREST - Page 1 
00507 
in the above-captioned action. 
2. I have calculated pre-judgment interest in the amount of$543,291.98 on each 
of the six (6) separate real estate development and construction loans which were calculated 
from Aprill7, 2009, (the day following the non-judicial foreclosure sales) to December 9, 
2010 pursuant to the various interest rates and corresponding per diem amounts as 
summarized in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
3. That, the interest rates set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto are the non-default rates 
in effect for each note as of Aprill7, 2009. 
DATED this qf::L day of December, 2010. 
BRYAN CHURCHILL, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public, this q1:lL day of 
December, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled 




BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST - Page 3 
£U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile No. (208) 342-4455 




Loan No. Principal Rate 12/9/10 Per Diem Accrued Interest 
313170-3 $13,825.68 7.250% 601 Days $2.75 $1,652.75 
316243-5 $2,039,381.90 7.00% 601 Days $391.11 $235,057.11 
316250-0 $2,353,925.35 7.750% 601 Days $499.80 $300,379.80 
329660-5 $15,229.39 8.250% 601 Days $3.44 $2,067.44 
329683-7 $16,960.22 8.250% 601 Days $3.83 $2,301.83 
329690-2 $13,487.13 8.250% 601 Days $3.05 $1,833.05 
TOTAL PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST: $543,291.98 
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David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise,ID 83701 \ \I €. \) 
Telephone: (208) 336-~~ C €. ,\) 
Fax: (208) 336-5956 ~C ~ <j 1.\l\ 
Attorneys for Washington Fe~~ngS ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
) 











This matter having come before the Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment and the Court's oral ruling from the bench on November 12, 2010 in favor of 
Plaintiff, Washington Federal Savings, and good and sufficient appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, 
adjudge, and decree that Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings have judgment against the 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
0051~ 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and severally, in the 
principal sum of Four Million Four Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine and 
6711 00 Dollars ($4,452,809.67), together with accrued pre-judgment interest from April 17 , 
2009 to December 9,2010, in the sum of Five Hundred F orty-Three Thousand Two Hundred 
Ninety-One and 981100 Dollars ($543,291.98), for a total judgment in the sum of Four 
Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Thousand One Hundred One and 65/1 00 Dollars 
($4,996,101.65). Interest upon this Judgment shall accrue at the statutory rate from and after 
the date of entry hereof. 
Dated this ,U day of December, 2010. 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Judgment, to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to 
the following: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
Thomas Banducci 
Wade Woodard 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 50 




David E. Wishney, LS.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, LS.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, 10 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Fax: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
NO'-----=:FIL£O:-;;;::--~a.-~ 'l?ls-::: 
A.MU ___ ~P.M......Jo_"--'."";;;;'-_ .. 
JAN 2 7 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JOHN WEATHERBY 
DePUTY 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
PlaintitTs, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGEL EN, 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE No. CV -OC 0917209 
) 
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Judgment in the sum of Four Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Thousand One 
Hundred One and 6511 00 Dollars ($4,996, I 0 1.65) having been entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff on the 14th day of December, 2010, the Plainti ff having filed its application for fees 
and costs, and no objection thereto having been filed by the Defendants, and the Court having 
entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs Fees and Costs in the sum of Forty Thousand Eight 
Hundred Ninety-Seven and 211100 Dollars ($40,897.21), and good and sufficient appearing 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, and this does order, 
adjudge, and decree that Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings have judgment against the 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and severally, in the sum 
of Five Million Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Eight and 8611 00 Dollars 
($5,036,998.86), plus interest thereon from the date of entry of the original Judgment herein, 
December 14th, 2010, at the statutory rate on the unpaid balance until said Judgment is paid 
in full. 
Dated this ~ 1 day of January, 2011. 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on the :;'1 day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Judgment, to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the 
following: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - Page 2 
Thomas Banducci 
Wade Woodard 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
00520 
NO. FILED 185 ~ 
A.M._---J·M,..JtC.~~-
ORIGINAL 2 5 2011 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
GARDEN 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard (lSB No. 6312) 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara Labrum (ISB No. 7177) 
dlabrum@bwslawgroup.com 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile (208) 342-4455 
Attorneysfor Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L4a 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS; ITS 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD DAVID E. WISHNEY AND CHAD BERNARDS, 
PO BOX 837, BOISE ID 83701; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT: 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 17, hereby gives notice of appeal as follows: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 00513 
A. Designation of Appeal: The above named Appellants H. Craig Van Engelen and 
Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") appeal against the above named Respondent, 
Washington Federal Savings to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 14th day of December 2010 (the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey). 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1), this Notice of Appeal shall be deemed to include and 
present on appeal all judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the order appealed and all 
orders, judgments or decrees entered after the order appealed. 
B. Jurisdictional Statement: The Van Engelens have the right to appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court the judgments described herein pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l). 
C. Preliminary Statement of Issues of Appeal: The following list of issues on 
appeal is preliminary in nature and is based upon such preliminary research and legal analysis as 
could reasonably be conducted to date. The Van Engelens therefore reserve their right to assert 
other issues on appeal. 
1. Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff, conferring a judgment against the Van Engelens. 
D. Reporter's transcript: The Van Engelens request the transcript of the Hearings 
on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, conducted on October 28,2010 and 
November 12, 2010. Such transcript shall be provided in electronic format. 
E. Clerk's Record: The Van Engelens request the following documents to be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate 
Rule 28 1: 
1 In a civil case, the Standard Record automatically includes the following: register of actions; any order sealing all 
or any portion of the record; the original and any amended complaint or petition; the original and any amended 
answer or response to the complaint or petition; the original and any amended counterclaim, third party claim, or 
cross-claim; the original and any amended answer or response to a counterclaim; the jury verdict rendered in a jury 
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1. Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 4/6/2010; 
2. Affidavit, filed 4/6/2010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments 
thereto, if any; 
3. Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
4/6/2010; 
4. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or, in Alternative, Motion 
for Continuance, filed 5/13/2010; 
5. Affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments 
thereto, if any; 
6. Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments 
thereto, if any; 
7. Affidavit of Dara Labrum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment/Motion for Continuance, filed 5/13/2010, and accompanying 
Exhibitsl Attachments thereto, if any; 
8. Notice of Vacating Summary Judgment Hearing, filed 5119/2010; 
9. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 9130/2010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments 
thereto, if any; 
10. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 9/30/2010; 
11. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 10/14/2010; 
12. Affidavit of Counsel, filed 10114/2010, and accompanying 
Exhibitsl Attachments thereto, if any; 
13. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 10/2112010; 
14. Supplemental Affidavit of Bryan Churchill in Support of Summary 
Judgment, filed 10/2112010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments 
thereto, if any; 
trial; the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and any memorandum decision entered by the court; all judgments 
and decrees; a list of all exhibits offered, whether or not admitted; notice of appeal and cross-appeal; any request for 
additional reporter's transcript or clerk's record; a court reporter's notice oflodging with the district court; table of 
contents and index, which shall be placed at the beginning of each volume of the record. I.A.R.28(b)(l) 
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15. Supplemental Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed 10/27/2010, and accompanying 
Exhibitsl Attachments thereto, if any; 
16. Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
111512010; 
17. Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen in Support of Supplemental Brief, filed 
1115/2010, and accompanying Exhibitsl Attachments thereto, if any; 
18. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
filed 111512010; 
19. Affidavit ofInterest, filed 12/9/2010, and accompanying 
Exhibitsl Attachments thereto, if any; 
20. Judgment, filed 12114/2010; 
21. The Deposition of Bryan Churchill, conducted on 06/28/2010, and 
exhibits thereto; 
22. The Deposition ofH. Craig Van Engelen, conducted on 06117/2010, and 
exhibits thereto; 
23. The Deposition of Kristen Van Engelen, conducted on 06117/2010, and 
exhibits thereto; 
24. The Deposition of Gloria Henson, conducted on 06129/2010, and exhibits 
thereto; and 
25. The Deposition of Dale Sullivan, conducted on 06/2812010, and exhibits 
thereto. 
F. I certify: 
1. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Reporter for the Deposition of Bryan Churchill: 
Amy E. Simmons 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Reporter for the Deposition of H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen: 
Maryann Matthews 
Burnham Habel & Associates 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 00516 
838 La Cassia Dr. 
Boise, ID 83705 
Reporter for the Deposition of Gloria Henson: 
Susan L. Sims 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
1618 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Reporter for the Hearings October 28,2010 and November 12,2010: 
Kim I. Madsen, Official Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 5123 
Boise, ID 83702 
2. That the court reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
3. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
4. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
5. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
G. The Van Engelens will also seek their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho App. R. 41. 
DATED this ~ day of January, 2011. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN 
~
Wade L. Woodard 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 00517 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
10"\ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ?S day of January 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
o U.S. Mail JS: Facsimile (208) 336-5956 o Hand Delivery o Overnight Delivery 
00518 
/ 
NO. FILED:jrzIl : 
A.M._---J.M ..J,;...1t.&---
David E. Wishney, LS.B. #1993 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
300 W. Myrtle, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 837 
FEB 09 2011 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By ABBY GARDEN 
DEPUTY Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Fax: (208) 342-5749 
Attorney for Respondent Washington Federal Savings 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, 
a United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 













CASE NO. CV OC 0917209 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
requests pursuant to Rule 19, LA.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record in 
addition to that required to be included by the LA.R. and by the notice of appeal. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
a. Motion to Strike and Memorandum in Support (5/l3/1O). 
b. Response to Motion to Strike (5/19/lO). 
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - PAGE 1 
00521 
c. Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Strike (6/17/10). 
d. Motion to Strike and Shorten Time (10/28/10). 
e. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Motion to Shorten Time 
(10/28/10). 
f. Motion to Strike Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen (11110/1 0). 
g. Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Craig Van Engelen (11/12/10). 
2. 1 certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. I further certify that the 
estimated fee for the preparation of this additional record has been paid. 
Dated this f day of February, 2011. 
Attorney for the Respondent 
Washington Federal Savings 
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - PAGE 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled 
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL was served this ~ 
day of February, 2011, on the following by: 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Attorney at Law 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 




Attorney for the Appellant Van Engelens 
Christopher D. Rich 
Clerk of the Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
Telephone: 208-287-6900 










David E. Wishney 













TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
m~~---a~--____ _ 
AM B: QD ";. -----
MAR 29 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RJCH,Qerk 
By 8RADl.EV J. THIES 
3@f.f~ 




NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on February 9, 2011, I 
12 lodged a corrected appeal transcript of 79 pages in 
length for the above-referenced appeal with the District 
13 Court Clerk of the County of Ada in the 4th Judicial 
District 
14 
This transcript contains hearings held on 
15 
... October 28, 2010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States corporation, Supreme Court Case No.38484 
Plaintiff-Respondent, CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and 
KRISTEN VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 28th day of March, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHmITS 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ________________ ~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and 
KRISTEN V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38484 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
THOMAS A. BANDUCCI 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DAVID E. WISHNEY 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and 
KRISTEN VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38484 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record ofthe pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
25th day ofJanuary, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
